Moral sentiment and moral judgment in Hume. by Fried, Dennis Farrell
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1977
Moral sentiment and moral judgment in Hume.
Dennis Farrell Fried
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fried, Dennis Farrell, "Moral sentiment and moral judgment in Hume." (1977). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2132.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2132

MORAL SENTIMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT IN HUME
A Dissertation Presented
By
Dennis Farrell Fried
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
June 1977
Philosophy
11
c Dennis Farrell Fried
All Rights Reserved
1977
MORAL SENTIMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT IN HUME
A Dissertation Presented
By
Dennis Farrell Fried
Approved as to style and content by:
- • 7 j r> ^ '
V Uvx . c(
Malcolm B. E. Smith, Chairperson of Committee
Head
IV
ABSTRACT
MORAL SENTIMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT IN HUME
June, 1977
Dennis Fried
B. S.
,
University of Michigan
M. S.
,
Florida State University
M. A.
,
State University of New York at Albany
M. A.
,
Ph. D.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor M. B. E. Smith
VAside from several short essays, the sources of Hume's
ethics are limited to two: A Treatise of Human Nature (1739 - 1740),
and Ari Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). These
comprise several hundred pages in which Hume investigates the
nature of "moral sentiments" and moral evaluations; yet, even a
careful study of this material does not make it clear just what Hume
takes these to be. This has resulted in almost as many different
interpretations of Hume on these issues as there have been com-
mentators.
With regard to the moral sentiment itself, there are questions
both as to its nature and its origin. Concerning the former question,
what kind of a feeling is the moral sentiment? Is it, for Hume, an
emotion (or "passion")or something akin to sensation? In the first
part of this thesis I will show that Hume is inconsistent in attempting
to maintain both that the moral sentiment is a kind of pleasure or
pain and that it is a genuine emotion or passion.
The second, and I think more important, issue concerning
Hume's moral sentiment is its origin. Hume is almost universally
interpreted as holding a moral sense theory. In such a theory the
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moral sentim ent is taken to be a unique kind of feeling, sensibly
different from all other kinds, which is experienced when contem-
plating certain actions and characters. This moral feeling is said to
issue from a moral sense, an "internal" counterpart to the physical
senses; whereas our physical senses are sensitive to external objects,
our moral sense is affected by the ideas of actions and characters.
I will argue in this thesis that, contrary to the usual inter-
pretations, Hume is not developing a moral sense theory in the
Treatise
. Though Hume himself refers on occasion to the workings
of a moral sense, it seems clear to me that he is there referring
only to what is commonly accepted as being the results of a moral
sense. Rather than countenancing the existence of a mysterious
internal faculty which produces our moral sentiments, Hume's third
book of the Treatise is largely devoted, I believe, to an "explication"
and a "resolution" of the so-called "moral sense" into the most basic
principles of human nature. On the interpretation I shall present in
this thesis, the moral sentiment is no longer taken to be a sensibly
unique feeling which issues from a distinct faculty; rather, the very
basic and instinctive human feelings of propensity for pleasure and
aversion to pain are, under certain restrictive conditions, defined by
Hume to be moral sentiments.
The next issue to be considered is the connection between
Vll
moral sentiments and moral evaluations in Hume. The most common
interpretations of Hume on this question can be divided into two
general classes. According to the first, a moral evaluation consists
in the very experiencing of the moral sentiment. Although there is
strong textual support for this view, I' shall argue in this thesis
that such an interpretation is not the most consistent that can be
given, relative to other things Hume has to say concerning the nature
of moral evaluation. My main argument for this will be based on
Hume's several indications that our moral sentiments in themselves
are frequently not sufficient indicators of moral value, and that we
can make a moral evaluation without experiencing a moral sentiment
at all. This suggests that, for Hume, a moral evaluation need not
consist in a mere feeling or sentiment, as this first interpretation
holds.
9
We are thus led to the second type of interpretation of Hume
on the nature of moral evaluation, in which a moral evaluation is
an actual judgment about what sort of (moral) sentiment would result
from the contemplation of a certain character or action. Once again,
though there is textual support for this interpretation, I will show
that it too must be rejected. Roughly, my argument will be this.
Hume clearly and frequently denies that moral judgments are "con-
clusions of reason. " Now a conclusion of reason for Hume is the
Vlll
belief in (or assent to) a proposition. But the distinguishing char-
acteristic of this second interpretation is the claim that a moral
judgment for Hume involves the assent to a certain factual proposi-
tion. Therefore, we must reject this interpretation as being in-
consistent with one of Hume's clearest requirements for moral
judgments.
I will then offer my own interpretation of Hume on moral
judgment, one which seems to share the strengths of the two standard
accounts, while avoiding those inconsistencies which ultimately
caused their rejection. In my interpretation I attempt to strike that
balance between feeling and judging, between passion and reason,
that Hume seems to be seeking; whether my account does more closely
fit what Hume says must, in the end, be decided by the reader.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Aside from several short essays, the sources of Hume's
ethics are limited to two: A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740),
and An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). These
comprise several hundred pages in which Hume investigates the
nature of moral sentiments' and moral evaluations; yet, even a
careful study of this material does not make it clear just what Hume
takes these to be. This has resulted in almost as many different
interpretations of Hume on these issues as there have been commen-
tators.
With regard to the moral sentiment itself, there are questions
both as to its nature and its origin. Concerning the former question,
what kind of a feeling is the moral sentiment? Is it, for Hume, an
emotion (or "passion") or something akin to sensation? In the first
part of this thesis I will show that Hume is inconsistent in attempting
to maintain both that the moral sentiment is a kind of pleasure or
pain and that it is a genuine emotion or passion.
The second, and I think more important, issue concerning
Hume's moral sentiment is its origin. Hume is almost universally
2interpreted as advocating what is called a "moral sense" theory ^
Such theories may take a variety of forms. However, they have in
common the contention that the moral feeling is a unique kind of
feeling, sensibly different from all other kinds, which is often ex-
perienced when contemplating certain actions and characters. In
such theories this moral feeling is said to issue from a moral sense,
which is taken to be an "internal" counterpart to the physical senses;
whereas our physical senses are sensitive to external objects, our
moral sense is affected by the ideas of actions and characters.
I will argue in this thesis that, contrary to the usual inter-
pretations, Hume is not developing a moral sense theory in the
Treatise
. Though Hume himself refers on occasion to the workings
of a moral sense, it seems clear to me that he is there referring
only to what is commonly accepted as being the results of a moral
sense. Rather than countenancing the existence of a mysterious
internal faculty which produces our moral sentiments, Hume's third
book of the Treatise is largely devoted, I believe, to an "explication"
and a "resolution" of the so-called "moral sense" into the most
basic principles of human nature. On the interpretation I shall
present in this thesis, the moral sentiment is no longer taken to be
a sensibly unique feeling which issues from a distinct faculty;
rather, the very basic and instinctive human feelings of propensity
3for pleasure and aversion to pain are, under certain restrictive
conditions, defined by Hume to be moral sentiments.
The next issue to be considered is the connection between
moral sentiments and moral evaluations in Hume. The most common
interpretations of Hume on this question can be divided into two
general classes. According to the first, a moral evaluation con-
sists in the experiencing of the moral sentiment; the details of such
an interpretation will vary according to the commentator's under-
standing of the nature and origin of the moral sentiment. Such an
interpretation of Hume on moral evaluation is found in several
places. There are numerous passages in Hume which can be taken
to support this "Emotionist" interpretation, as Pall Ardal terms it:
So that when you pronounce any action or character to be
vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution
of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame
from the contemplation of it (T, p. 46 9). 3
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfac-
tion of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character
The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration (T,
p. 472).
Language must
. . .
invent a peculiar set of terms in order to
express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation
which arise from humanity, or from views of general use-
fulness and its contrary (I, p. 95).
In moral deliberations . . . all the circumstances of the case
are to be laid before us ere we can fix any sentence of blame
or approbation
. . .
The approbation which then ensues cannot
be the work of the judgment but of the heart; and it is not a
speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling
or sentiment (I, p. 188).
4Such passages constitute strong support for the plausibility
of the Emotionist interpretation of moral evaluation in Hume. Never-
theless, in this thesis I shall maintain that this interpretation is not
the most consistent that can be given, relative to other things Hume
has to say concerning the nature of moral evaluation. My main argu-
ment for this will be based on Hume's several indications that our
moral sentiments in themselves are frequently not sufficient indica-
tors of moral value, and that we can make a moral evaluation without
experiencing a moral sentiment at all. For example;
In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable,
according to our situation of nearness or remoteness, with
regard to the person blam'd or prais'd, and according to the
present disposition of our mind. But these variations we
regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms
expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as
if we remain'd in one point of view. Experience soon teaches
us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least,
of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more
stubborn and inalterable (T, p. 582)
The case is the same, as when we correct the different
sentiments of virtue, which proceed from its different dis-
tances from ourselves. The passions do not always follow
our corrections; but these corrections serve sufficiently to
regulate our abstract notions, and are alone regarded, when
we pronounce in general concerning the degrees of vice and
virtue (T, p. 585)
The case is here the same as in our judgments concerning
external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by their distance
But tho' the appearance of objects to our senses be the original
standard, by which we judge of them, yet we do not say,
that they actually diminish by the distance; but correcting the
appearance by reflection, arrive at a more constant and
5establish'd judgment concerning them. In like manner, tho'
sympathy be much fainter than our concern for ourselves,
and a sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter
than that with persons near and contiguous; yet we neglect
all these differences in our calm judgments concerning the
characters of men (T, p. 603)
There is no necessity that a generous action, barely men-
tioned in an old history or remote gazette, should com-
municate any strong feelings of applause and admiration.
Virtue, placed at such a distance, is like a fixed star which,
though to the eye of reason it may appear as luminous as the
sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed as to affect the
senses neither with light nor heat (I, p. 57)
These and other passages suggest that, for Hume, a moral evaluation
need not consist in a mere feeling or sentiment, as the Emotiunist
interpretation holds.
This leads to the second type of interpretation of the nature
of moral evaluation in Hume, which Ardal terms the "Reflectivist"
account. On this type of interpretation, moral evaluations are actual
judgments that something is the case. Such an interpretation is
suggested by passages such as the following:
In like manner [to that of moral determinations]
,
external
beauty is determin'd merely by pleasure; and ' tis evident, a
beautiful countenance cannot give so much pleasure, when
seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when it is brought
nearer to us. We say not, however, that it appears to us
less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will have in
such a position, and by that reflexion we correct its momen-
tary appearance (T, p. 582).
Our servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite stronger senti-
ments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus, as represented
6in history; but we say not upon that account, that the former
character is more laudable than the latter. We know, that
were we to approach equally near to that renown' d patriot,
he wou'd command a much higher degree of affection and
admiration (T, p. 582).
We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history,
with one perform'd in our neighborhood t'other day: The
meaning of which is, that we know from reflexion, that the
former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of disap-
probation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position
(T, p. 584).
In his Five Types of Ethical Theory
,
C. D. Broad gives a
Reflectivist interpretation of Hume on moral evaluation. Broad
argues that, for Hume, to evaluate x as virtuous (vicious) is to judge
that "x is such that the contemplation of it would call forth an emotion
of approval (disapproval) in all or most men. " This kind of inter-
pretation, however, is inadequate; as I shall later show, it is not,
according to Hume, that what most men approve is thereby virtuous.
Rather, it is that, owing to the similarity in the emotional constitu-
tion of all humans, most men's moral determinations do in fact agree.
A more plausible Reflectivist interpretation is given by
Geoffrey Hunter when he attributes to Hume the view that "a moral
judgment states that there is a causal relation between the contempla-
tion by the speaker of some actual or imagined state of affairs and
a certain sort of feeling or sentiment that he has when he does the
contemplation. However, Hunter's formulation fails to emphasize
7that the contemplation by the speaker" must be of a very special
sort - namely, contemplation from the moral point of view. What
this entails will also be a topic of concern in this thesis. Rachael M.
Kydd remedies this deficiency in her (Reflectivist) interpretation of
Hume; for one to judge that x is good is for one to judge that "x is the
kind of thing which, considered without regard to the special relation
in which it stands to my personal interests, arouses fee .mgs of
pleasure in me or any other disinterested spectator of like sus-
ceptibilities.
Yet, I will show that all such Reflectivist interpretations must
be rejected also. Roughly, my argument will be this. Hume clearly
and frequently denies that moral judgments are "conclusions of
reason. " Now a conclusion of reason for Hume is the belief in (or
assent to) a proposition. But the distinguishing characteristic of a
Reflectivist interpretation is the claim that a moral judgment for
Hume involves the assent to a certain factual proposition. Therefore,
we must reject all Reflectivist interpretations as being inconsistent
with one of Hume’s clearest requirements for moral judgments.
I will then give my own interpretation of Hume on moral judg-
ment, one which seems to share the strengths of both the Emotionist
and the Reflectivist accounts, but which avoids those inconsistencies
which ultimately caused their rejection. Any such attempt must
8reconcile the following strains in Hume;
Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd of
(T, p. 470).
5
The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our
reason (T, p. 458).
'twere impossible we cou'd ever make use of language, or
communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not
correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook
our present situation (T, p. 582).
The passions do not always follow our corrections; but these
corrections serve sufficiently to regulate our abstract
notions, and are alone regarded, when we pronounce in
general concerning the degrees of vice and virtue (T, p. 585).
The Emotionist account goes wrong by emphasizing the former two
notions at the expense of the latter two, while the Reflectivist inter-
pretation makes the reverse mistake. In my interpretation I attempt
to strike that balance that Hume seems to be seeking; whether my
account does more closely fit what Hume says must, in the end, be
decided by the reader.
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CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF THE MORAL SENTIMENT
1
Although I will later argue that it is Hume's view that one need
not be experiencing the moral sentiment in order to make a moral
judgment, the concept of the moral sentiment is involved in such a
judgment. Moreover, one who had never experienced the moral
sentiment (although Hume doubts the existence of such men) could
not have grounds for making a moral judgment, for he would lack the
experiential evidence necessary to support it. In the present chapter
I will investigate the nature of this moral sentiment.
Hume classifies the objects of human consciousness, which he
calls "perceptions, " into two kinds: impressions and ideas.
Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence,
we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend
all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make
their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint
images of these in thinking and reasoning
. .
.
(T, p. 1).
The moral sentiment is, according to Hume, an impression. In
sections 2 and 3 of this chapter I will inquire into the kind of impres-
sion Hume takes the moral sentiment to be, and I will argue that
Hume's description of the moral sentiment both as a kind of pleasure
(or pain) and as a passion involves him in an inconsistency. However,
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in the present section I will be concerned with Hume's distinction
between impressions and ideas. This will be important not only to
our present understanding of the nature of impressions themselves,
but in Chapter III where the conversion of an idea into an impression
through sympathy is examined, and later in Chapter VI, where it will
become necessary to distinguish a moral sentiment from the idea of
a moral sentiment.
Impressions and ideas may be simple or complex, where a
simple impression has no other impression as a constituent, and a
complex impression is one which is not simple; the distinction is
analogous for ideas. Hume's thorough-going empiricism finds ex-
pression in statements to the effect that "all our simple ideas in their
first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are
correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent" (T, p. 4).
A complex adea might not itself "exactly represent" any prior im-
pression, but the simple ideas which are the ultimate constituents
of the complex ideas must.
It is one of Hume's most critical failings that he does not
give an adequate account of the difference between impressions and
ideas; are they different in kind or merely in degree? Hume often
tends to stress the difference as one of degree;
Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent
12
emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impres-
sions: As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our
impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish
them from our ideas (T, p. 2).
All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds, viz. im-
pressions and ideas, which differ from each other~only in
their different degrees of force and vivacity (T, p. 96).
This suggests the following interpretation. All human perceptions
are of the same kind; however, perceptions can differ in their
strength or intensity. On the scale of intensities there is an idealized
boundary. All perceptions with intensities that fall below this line
are classified as ideas, while all perceptions with intensities above
the line are classified as impressions. Thus, on this interpretation,
the most intense idea is less intense than the least intense im-
pression.
It is clear that this simple picture will not do for Hume. In
the first place, Hume's very definition of an idea introduces a kind
distinction between impressions and ideas; "By ideas I mean the
faint images of /impressions]in thinking and reasoning" (T, p. 1).
Not only are ideas less lively than impressions, but "all our simple
ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions,
which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent"
(T, p. 4). Hume maintains that, in some sense, ideas are rep-
resentative while impressions are not; this is not consistent with
maintaining that the only difference between impressions and ideas
13
is "force and vivacity. "
The intensity interpretation is also inconsistent with Hume's
treatment of belief. Hume's doctrine of belief is highly complex,
and undergoes alterations as the Treatise progresses. Here I can
do no more than sketch enough of the doctrine to show its incompati-
bility with the intensity view of the distinction between impressions
and ideas.
The objects of belief for Hume are propositions; he begins an
investigation of "the nature of the idea or belief" by asking "Wherein
consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposi-
tion?" (T, p. 95). Hume equates a proposition with a set of one or
more ideas; he tells us that for you and I to entertain the same prop-
osition is for you and I to have the same ideas (T, p. 95). The prob-
lem Hume poses is this. Quite clearly, you and I can entertain the
same proposition in that we can "conceive the (same) ideas"; never-
theless, your conception may be attended with belief while mine is
not. What, then, would constitute such a difference in our conceptions?
Hume's answer is that a "belief is a more vivid and intense
conception of an idea" (T, p. 103). As an illustration of this, Hume
offers the following:
This definition will also be found to be entirely conformable
to everyone's feeling and experience. Nothing is more evident,
than that those ideas, to which we assent, are more strong.
14
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Hume realizes, however, that there can be variations in the
liveliness of an idea without variations in belief. For instance, a
science fiction writer's conception of a colony on Mars will be far
more vivid and lively than my own, though neither one of us believes
that such a colony exists. Again, the liveliness of my own conception
of such a colony may vary from time to time, though at no time do
I believe that any such colony exists. The next question Hume must
answer is: how lively or intense must an idea be in order to con-
stitute a belief?
9
Hume begins to answer this question by observing that an
idea which constitutes a belief affects our emotions and actions in a
way which a mere idea does not. When I merely entertain the thought
of a lion bearing down on me, my emotions and behavior remain un-
affected; but if I believe that such a thing is actually happening, I
will most probably feel fear and run. The latter is to be compared
with a situation in which I see a lion bearing down on me (i. e.
,
in
Hume's terminology, I have the impression of a lion bearing down on
15
me); there can be little doubt how such an impression will affect me.
The effects of the belief resemble the effects of the impression, and
this provides Hume with an essential clue:
The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an
equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like in-
fluence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making
an idea approach an impression in force and vivacity. For as
the different degrees of force make all the original difference
betwixt an impression and an idea, they must of consequence
be the source of all the differences in the effects of these
perceptions, and their removal, in whole or in part, the cause
of every new resemblance they acquire. Wherever we can
make an idea approach the impressions in force and vivacity
it will likewise imitate them in its influence on the mind;
and vice versa, where it imitates them in that influence, as
in the present case, this must proceed from its approaching
them in force and vivacity. Belief, therefore, since it causes
an idea to imitate the effects of the impressions, must make
it resemble them in these qualities, and is nothing but a more
vivid and intense conception of any idea (T, pp. 119-120;
italics mine).
Hume's answer then is that an idea becomes belief when its intensity
approximates that of an impression.
The inconsistency in Hume's position now becomes apparent.
Even in the present passage Hume insists that "the different degrees
of force make all the original difference betwixt an impression and
an idea. " Consider, then, my (sufficiently and appropriately de-
tailed) idea of the lion and my impression of the lion. The only
"original difference" between them will be in their intensities. Thus,
it would seem, if the intensity of my idea were augmented a sufficient
16
amount, the idea would become an impression, it seems that this
must be the case if my idea were a belief, for, according to Hume,
in order for its effects to be those of an impression its intensity
must be that of an impression.
But nowhere in Hume's account of belief, which comprises a
large part of Book I of the Treatise
,
does he say or imply that an
idea which is believed becomes thereby an impression; rather, a
belief approaches an impression in force and vivacity, " it is "equal"
to an impression and has a "like influence on the passions, " it
"imitates [an impression] in its influence on the mind" - this is not
the language we would expect of Hume if his view were that a belief
is an impression. The implication of this is that, though a lively
idea may approximate an impression in intensity, it will retain its
identity as an idea rather than an impression. This is incompatible
with the view that impressions and ideas "differ from each other
only in their different degrees of force and vivacity" (T, p. 96).
To further cloud the issue, Hume appears to do a complete
turn-about in Book II, "Of the Passions, " when he discusses the
operation of the human faculty he calls "sympathy, " which is the
ability to "receive by communication [the] inclinations and senti-
ments [of others] " (T, p. 316).
When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known
17
only by its effects, and by those external signs in the coun-
tenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This
idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires
such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very
passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original
affection (T, p. 317).
idea of a sentiment or passion, may
, . , be so inliven'd
as to become the very sentiment or passion (T, p. 319).
. . .
the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the
very impressions they represent (T, p. 319).
In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an
impression (T, p. 370).
Hume is saying here that a sufficiently intense idea of a passion
(passions are impressions), as generated by sympathy, will be the
passion itself; this is not only compatible with the view that the only
difference between an impression and an idea is intensity, it re-
..
1
quires it.
Hume does attempt to account for this difference in the effects
of belief and sympathy. Our beliefs concern the "external" world,
and the ideaswhich constitute such beliefs are "copies" of impres-
sions which are forced on us by external agents - these impressions
are the sensations we receive through our five "physical" senses.
Our control over such impressions is very limited, and we cannot
cause ourselves to have any impression of a certain sensation by
starting with the idea of that sensation; we cannot cause ourselves
actually to experience physical pain by an act of the imagination.
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Such is not the case, according to Hume, with those impressions
which are the passions, or affections"; although any idea of a passion
that we may have must be derived from or copy some prior im-
pression of that passion, such an impression may be generated by
sufficient enlivening of a prior idea;
' tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by
C sympathy] be so inliven'd as to become the very sentiment
or passion. The lively idea of any object always approaches
its impression
. . . But this is most remarkable in the
opinions and affectations; and 'tis there principally that a
lively idea is converted into an impression. Our affections
depend more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of
the mind, than any other impressions; for which reason they
arise more naturally from the imagination, and from every
lively idea we form of them. This is the nature and cause of
sympathy (T, p. 319).
Nevertheless, this explanation does nothing to resolve the
present difficulty: in his account of belief, augmenting an idea to
the intensity of an impression does not convert the idea to an im-
pression, whereas on his account such a conversion does occur in
the case of sympathy - the former account is incompatible with the
intensity interpretation of the distinction between impression and
idea, while the latter requires it. The failure to resolve this in-
consistency is a serious shortcoming in Hume's attempt to describe
the objects of human consciousness and the principles which relate
them. However, this difficulty is not one with Hume's ethical theory
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as such, and in what follows I will assume, with Ilume, that the
distinction between impressions and ideas has been clearly and
consistently made.
2
Book II of the Treatise
,
"Of the Passions, " is devoted to a
classification of the impressions. The moral sentiment is an im-
pression (T, p. 470); as such, an adequate understanding of its nature
should at least enable us to place that sentiment within Hume’s classi-
fication of the impressions. Hume himself never does this - the moral
sentiment is never directly mentioned in all of Book II; nor in Book
Of Morals, where the moral sentiment theory of morals is
developed, is this division of the impressions ever mentioned in
connection with the moral sentiment. Therefore, if we are to attempt
to place the moral sentiment we must compare what Hume says about
it in Book III with what he says about the various types of impressions
in Book II.
According to Hume, the moral sentiment is one of pleasure or
pain; ".
. .
the distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or
evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures" (T, p.
471). Hume very often equates the pleasurable moral sentiment with
a .certain feeling of "satisfaction, " and the painful moral sentiment
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with a certain feeling of "uneasiness. " However, Hume maintains
that there are different kinds of pleasures and pains, or feelings of
satisfaction and uneasiness:
For, Jirst, 'tis evident, that under the term pleasure, we
comprehend sensations, which are very different from each
other, and which have only such a distant resemblance, as
is requisite to make them be express'd by the same abstract
term. A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine
equally produce pleasure; and what is more, their goodness
is determin'd merely by the pleasure. But shall we say upon
that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of
a good flavour? In like manner an inanimate object, and the
character or sentiments of any person may, both of them,
give satisfaction; but as the satisfaction is different, this'
keeps our sentiments concerning them from being confounded,
and makes us ascribe virtue to the one, and not to the other.
Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises
from characters and actions, of that peculiar kind, which
makes us praise or condemn. The good qualities of an
enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem
and respect. 'Tis only when a character is considered in
general, without reference to our particular interest, that
it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it
morally good or evil (T, p. 472).
The pleasures and pains derived from one "physical" sense
will be different in kind than those derived from another. Further,
Hume maintains that there are certain distinct kinds of pleasures and
pains which are not associated with the operation of the physical
senses; to such pleasures and pains Hume has assigned at least three
different origins: wit, beauty, and morality.
No one has ever been able to tell what wit is.
. .
'Tis only
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by taste we can decide concerning it, nor are we possest ofany other standard, upon which we can form a judgment ofthis kmd. Now what is this taste
, from which true and false
wit in a manner receive their being, and without which no
thought can have a title to either of these denominations?
Tis plainly nothing but a sensation of pleasure from true wit
an o uneasiness from false, without our being able to tell
the reasons of that pleasure or uneasiness. The power ofbestowing these opposite sensations is, therefore, the very
essence of true and false wit; and consequently the cause of
that pride or humility, which arises from them (T, p. 297)
. . . beauty like wit, cannot be defin'd, but is discerned only
by a taste or sensation
. . . beauty is nothing but a form, which
produces pleasure, as deformity is a structure of parts, which
conveys pain
..
.
(T, p. 299).
An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious;
Why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a
particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the
pleasure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or
virtue. To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel
a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of
a character
. . .
The case is the same as in our judgments con-
cerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our
approbation is imply' d in the immediate pleasure they convey
to us (T, p. 471).
Again, we are to understand that the pleasures and pains derived from
contemplation of wit, beauty, and morals differ from each other, as
well as from those derived from the physical senses. The pleasure
derived from a good joke is different from that derived from a
beautiful painting, and both differ from the pleasure produced by the
contemplation or observation of a moral character.
There are yet other sources of pleasure and pain; Hume in-
sists that the satisfaction or frustration (or the prospect thereof) of
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certain passions and desires can also cause pleasure or pain. For
instance, the satisfaction of our hunger gives us a certain pleasure;
the satisfaction of our lust gives a different kind of pleasure-
Of this kind of passion is the desire of punishment to our
enemies, and ot happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and
a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly
speaking, produce pleasure and pain, and proceed not from
them, like the other affections (T, p. 439).
This helps explain Hume's view that we often experience
pleasures or pains that are not moral sentiments upon contemplating
certain human characters or actions. Such pleasures and pains pro-
ceed from the belief that a character or action contributes to the
satisfaction of a particular desire. For example, suppose that I
t.
desire to be elected to a certain office, and I witness an acquaintance
campaigning vigorously on my behalf. I will feel a certain satis-
faction or pleasure upon witnessing this mode of behavior because
I believe it will aid in the satisfaction of my desire to be elected.
Such a feeling of pleasure will not be the moral sentiment because
it originates from the prospective satisfaction of a personal desire:
Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises
from characters and actions, of that peculiar kind, which makes
us praise or condemn. The good qualities of an enemy are
hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem and
respect. 'Tis only when a character is considered in general,
without reference to our particular interest, that it causes
such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good
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or evil (T, p. 472; second set of italics mine).
The pleasures and pains we derive from contemplation of a certain
behavior's tendency to enhance or retard fulfillment of our particular
desires are different in kind from those derived from a disinterested
view; we cannot experience those peculiar pleasures and pains which
are the moral sentiments unless we consider a character or action
in general, without reference to our particular interest" - that is,
by adopting the moral point of view. I will later return to a more
detailed examination of this condition for the experiencing of the
moral sentiment.
3
Where, then, are the peculiar pleasures and pains that are
the moral sentiments to be placed in Hume's classification of the
impressions? To attempt an answer requires that we examine this
classification in some detail. Hume divides the impressions into two
main classes; those that are "original" and those that are "secondary.
Hume also calls the former "impressions of sensation" and the latter
"impressions of reflection" or "passions" (also "sentiments, "
'emotions, " and "affections"). The impressions of sensation "are
such as without any antecedent perceptions arise in the soul, from
the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the
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application of objects to the external organs" (T, p. 275). These
include the sensory sensations and "all bodily pains and pleasures. "
Such "bodily" pains and pleasures are those that are derived from
the physical senses.
It should be clear that these pleasures and pains are not the
moral sentiments; unlike the latter, the former perceptions arise
spontaneously inasmuch as they are not connected in any way to
any antecedent perceptions (i. e.
, impressions or ideas). Though the
idea of a razor cutting my flesh can generate in me the idea of
tactile pain, it can never generate in me the impression of that
pain, nor can my visual impression of a razor fast approaching. It
is the actual application of the razor to my flesh that will cause in
me, via "unknown" (T, p. 7) "natural and physical" (T, p. 275)
processes, the impression of pain. In contrast, the moral sentiment
is always caused by antecedent impressions or ideas of a character
or action:
. . . from a primary constitution of nature certain characters
and passions, by the very view and contemplation, produce a
pain, and others in like manner excite a pleasure (T, p. 296)
An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious;
why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of
a particular kind
. . . To have the sense of virtue, is nothing
but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the con-
templation of a character (T, p. 471).
The pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey
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or view of any action or quality of the mind,
vice and virtue (T, p. 614).
constitutes its
Thus, the moral sentiment, being caused by an antecedent im-
pression or idea, cannot be classified as an original impression.
The secondary impressions, unlike the original impressions,
are prompted by antecedent perceptions; so it would seem that the
moral sentiment should fall within this category. Hume further
divides the secondary or reflective impressions into the "direct"
and the "indirect. " The direct passions are "such as arise immedi-
ately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure" (T, p. 276);
these passions may be induced by pain or pleasure that is actual,
or merely by the prospect (i. e. idea) of pain or pleasure. The
type of direct passion that will be produced depends on whether the
pain or pleasure is actual or potential, and, if potential, on the
probability which we associate with its occurrence. Under the
direct passions Hume lists "desire, aversion, grief, joy, fear,
despair and security" (T, p. 277).
The mechanism of the indirect passions is more complex;
"under the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition,
vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their
dependents" (T, p. 277). By "dependents" Hume means passions
which are a composition of two or more of the indirect passions;
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for instance, love mixed with humility is the passion of esteem, and
hate mixed with pride is contempt. In describing the operation of
the indirect passions Hume concentrates on four of them: pride,
humility, love, and hate.
An indirect passion must have an object, that to which the
passion is directed; for Hume, this is the object whose idea is
"excited" in us when we experience the passion. In the case of love
or hate, the object is always another "person or thinking being, "
l
while with pride and humility the object is always self; our affections
for inanimate objects and animals are not, according to Hume, in-
stances of love. This restriction on the possible objects of these
indirect passions is inexplicable; Hume attributes it to "an original
quality or primary impulse" (T, p. 280, p. 329), inseparable from
the human constitution.
An indirect passion also has a cause, which is distinct from
the object. The cause of my love, or pride, is some quality which
provides me with pleasure, and the cause of my hate, or humility,
is some quality which provides me with pain; moreover, the cause
of an indirect passion must be associated in idea with the object of
the passion. We commonly refer to the cause of our love (or hate)
as the reason why we love (or hate) someone. Such reasons may be
extremely varied, but, Hume argues, they always involve something
associated with the person which gives us pleasure or pain. For
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instance, my mistress may provide me with sensual pleasures. I
come to associate such pleasures with her, and she becomes the
object of my love. Or, my neighbor might own a dog which fre-
quently bites me. I soon come to associate the unpleasantness of
these events with my neighbor, and I may come to hate him for it.
Similarly, the pleasures and pains that invoke pride c nility
must have a cause that is closely related to self. These most often
will be one's own character traits or possessions.
The association of the cause of an indirect passion with that
passion's object must be a strong one if it is to produce the senti-
ment at all. If my mistress is very sparing or unpredictable with
her charms, my association of her with sensual pleasure may be too
weak to produce the passion of love. Or, if my neighbor knows nothing
about his dog's ill manners, this might weaken my association of
him and his dog's painful attacks enough to prevent the production of
hate in me. Because the association between object and cause must
be so strong, Hume believes that we never come to love or hate
someone on the basis of single actions alone; these passions are
aroused only if we believe that the person's actions arise because of
a certain quality of mind or character which is a relatively permanent
aspect of that person. Only then will the association between the
pleasures or pains which his actions have caused us and our idea of
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the person himself become strong enough to allow the production of
love or hate.
Thus, part of Hume's explanation of the mechanism of the
indirect passions involves an association of ideas, between that of
certain pleasures or pains and that of the object; but Hume also
relies on what he calls an "association of impressions. " Different
passions have different sensations, but these sensations share vary-
ing degrees of resemblance. According to Hume, when we ex-
perience one passion we have a tendency to consequently experience
other passions which resemble it:
All resembling impressions are connected together, and no
sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief
and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy
to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle
be compleated (T, p. 283).
Thus, when we experience pleasure, we tend to experience pleasant
passions. When our pleasure results from something which we closely
associate in idea with a certain person or our self, we tend to ex-
perience the pleasant sentiment of love or pride, with that person
or self as its object; a parallel mechanism underlies the production
of the unpleasant sentiments of hate and humility. Hume is quite
fond of referring to this mechanism of the indirect passions as "a
double relation between impressions and ideas. "
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What is at once both evident and disturbing is the absence
from Hume's lists of the direct and indirect passions of any kind of
pleasure or pain. Granted, we have no reason to assume that Hume
considers these lists to be complete. But it is extremely doubtful
that a man who claims that "the chief .spring or actuating principle
of the human mind is pleasure or pain" (T, p. 574) would neglect to
include species of pleasure or pain in such lengthy lists of the direct
and indirect passions - unless he does not believe that they belong
there.
In truth, Hume cannot include pleasures or pains in the direct
or indirect passions because pleasure and pain are, according to him,
the efficient causes of the direct and indirect passions; " 'Tis easy
to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded
on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of
any kind, 'tis only requisite to present some gooa or evil [i. e. some
pleasure or pain] " (T, p. 438). Such pleasures or pains may be
physical (i. e.
,
impressions of sensation), they may be those that
are derived from wit, beauty, or morals, or they may be produced
by the actual or prospective satisfaction or frustration of passions
or desires. For example, in the section "Of the direct passions"
Hume tells us that "a suit of fine clothes produces pleasure from
their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the
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impressions of volition and desire" (T, p. 439). The pleasure is not
itself a direct passion, but rather is a part of the hidden mental
process which concludes with the experiencing of such a passion.
Again, in Hume s detailed discussion of the indirect passions
he endeavors to show that these passions always involve in their
efficient cause "a pleasure or uneasiness separate from the passion"
(T, p. 295), "a pain or pleasure independent of the passion" (T, pp.
298-299). These pains and pleasures are not themselves indirect
passions; rather, they are crucial elements in Hume's explanation
of the origin of the indirect passions.
Norman Kemp Smith, in his critical study The Philosophy of
David Hume
,
recognizes the difficulties encountered in attempting to
place the non-bodily pleasures and pains in Hume's classification of
the impressions. He also rightly points out that it is "more by
implication than by express statement" that Hume distinguishes
between "bodily pains and pleasures and the pleasures and pains
that arise from objects immediately upon their mere contemplation. "2
Nevertheless, Smith does not believe that this difficulty in classifi-
cation extends to the moral sentiments because he does not hold that
the moral sentiments are pains or pleasures at all, though, as are
all passions, it is "pleasure and pain upon which they are 'founded 1 .
In Smith's view, both the moral and the aesthetic sentiments
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can be identified as being the passions which we experience
ggjkg mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in action
and external forms, and may accordingly be further described
as being modes of approval and disapproval
. They constitute
our delight in the beautiful, our revulsion from the ugly or
disordered, our sentiments of praise and blame in the pres-
ence of virtue and vice. As thus immediately arising upon
an act of contemplation, they have to be classed with the
direct, not with the indirect passions. 4
In my next chapter I will show that the moral sentiment does indeed
share some important characteristics of the direct passions. How-
ever, Hume is insistent throughout the Treatise on equating the moral
sentiment with a "peculiar” kind of pleasure or pain. As such, there
is no consistent way to classify the moral sentiment as a passion,
either direct or indirect.
I have argued that Hume's exclusion of pleasures and pains
from his lists, in Book II, of the direct and indirect passions is a
strong indication that he does not believe that they belong there.
However, there is a single passage at the beginning of Book II in
which Hume seems to be saying that the moral sentiment is an
impression of reflection:
The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds,
viz
,
the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense
of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external
objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred,
grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from
being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently
rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions,
properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion.
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as to become, in a manner, imperceptible (T, p. 276).
This passage does nothing to ease the problem of the classification
of the moral sentiment. Hume points out a few lines later that the
calm-violent distinction is "vulgar and specious. " The legitimate
concern is with the direct-indirect distinction. There is still no
consistent way to classify the moral sentiment, be it calm or other-
wise, as direct or indirect, and thus no consistent way to classify
it as an impression of reflection, or passion.
There remains at this point to offer a conjecture as to why
Hume is so unclear as to the status of the moral sentiment. In this,
I once again find myself at odds with Kemp Smith. Smith contends
that "Hume thought out the teaching of the Treatise in the reverse
order from that in which he expounds it; when he started, it was his
ethics in which he was primarily interested. " 5 If Smith is right in
this, if indeed the development of the ethical theory which Hume
offers in Book III predates and motivates the development of the
theories of the understanding and the passions, Hume's total failure
in placing the moral sentiment in his scheme of impressions becomes
all the more astounding. Further, in conjunction with this, is it
at all plausible that if Smith is correct in identifying the moral
sentiment as a direct passion that Hume would declare, in Book II,
that but for two minor, and for the present point, irrelevant,
|
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exceptions "none of the direct affections seem to merit our particular
attention" (T, p. 439)? I think not.
With this in mind, I am inclined to take Hume's pronounce-
ments in his introduction to the Treatise at face value. There he
tells us that it is his intention to develop "a science of man, " to
"explain the principles of human nature. " Such a science, he be-
lieves, is necessary for the development of every other science,
even such as "mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion. "
In treating of the understanding and the passions in Books I and II,
respectively, Hume attempts to develop this science of man; and
Book III, "Of Morals, " can be considered to be an illustration of
how these basic principles of human nature can be used to develop
sciences which deal with more specific human phenomena - in this
case that of "morals. "
I am not, however, without hopes, that the present system
of philosophy fi. e.
,
Hume's science of man} will acquire
new force as it advances; and that our reasonings concerning
morals will corroborate whatever has been said concerning
the understanding and the passions (T, p. 455).
This way of proceeding would be analogous to a scientist concluding
a text on the physics of wave motion with a section on the phenomenon
of sound - the basic physical principles developed in the first part
of the text would be applied in the second section to a specific kind
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of wave motion, sound.
It is likely then that, in writing Books I and II, Hume does
not have in mind any particular application of his basic principles,
such as the science of morals, to the exclusion of others. This
provides some explanation of why Hume has neglected to be more
specific, and exhibits some confusion, about the moral sentiment in
Book II. It does not, of course, explain why Hume is not more specific
in Book III where is concerned with morality, and the moral sentiment.
Perhaps here Hume has come to believe that the status of the moral
sentiment as a passion is too obvious to consider in detail. Of course,
it is not. In omitting a consideration of this question from Book III,
either by design or not, Hume overlooks the very serious conflicts
which arise from holding both that the moral sentiment is a species
of pain or pleasure and that it is a legitimate passion.
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CHAPTER III
THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL SENTIMENT
1
Hume's moral sentiment, then, is a "peculiar" kind of
pleasure or pain. The question I wish to examine now is whether or
not this moral sentiment derives from a "moral sense. " As I
mentioned in my Introduction, the conventional wisdom concurs in
treating Hume as a moral sense theorist. One difficulty in appraising
such an interpretation, however, is the vagueness of the term
moral sense. " Most often, the moral sense is described as an
"internal" counterpart to our physical senses; yet, such a description
by analogy suffers all the more from the difficulties in saying just
what a physical sense is.
A classic, and perhaps the first, formulation of a moral
sense theory is found in the works of Frances Hutcheson (1694-1746). 1
Hutcheson describes the moral sense as follows:
That as the Author of Nature has determin'd us to receive,
by our external senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of
Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our
Bodys; and to receive from uniform Objects the Pleasures
of Beauty and Harmony ... in the same manner he has
given us a MORAL SENSE, to direct our Actions, and to
give us still nobler Pleasures
. . .
We mean by (the moral
sense] only a Determination of our Minds to receive
amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when they occur
to our Observation, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage
or Loss to redound to our selves from them ... ~
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Hutcheson insists that these pleasures or pains which are the moral
sentiments are different in kind from those derived from our physical
senses, or from views of our own interests and desires. We must
then be said to have the "power" of receiving such pleasures and
pains, and this "Power of receiving these Perceptions may be
call’d a MORAL SENSE. " 3
That the Perceptions of moral Good and Evil, are perfectly
ent from those of natural Good, or Advantage every
one must convince himself, by reflecting on the different
Manner in which he finds himself affected when these ob-
jects occur to him. ^
. . . some Actions have to Men an immediate Goodness; or,
that by a superior Sense, which I call a Moral one, we
perceive Pleasure in the Contemplation of such Actions in
others, and are determin'd to love the Agent, (and much
more do we perceive Pleasure in being conscious of having
done such Actions ourselves) without any View of further
natural Advantage from them. 3
Hutcheson maintains that empirical investigation reveals
that, in fact, all actions whose contemplations invoke the pleasant
sentiment of approval have a common quality: they spring from a
feeling of benevolence, or love of others. This, however, is a
contingent matter. Though Hutcheson argues that the actual consti-
tution of our moral sense is most in keeping with our idea of the
nature of our creator, God, it could logically be otherwise:
If it be here enquir'd 'Could not the DEITY have given us a
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different or contrary determination of Mind, viz to approve
Actions upon another Foundation than Benevolence?' It
is certain, there is nothing in this surpassing the natural
Power of the DEITY. ^
Hutcheson recognizes at least five different types of senses
(i. e.
,
modes of "determinations of our minds to receive amiable
or disagreeable ideas") in human beings: external senses (which
I have called the physical senses), the sense of beauty and harmony
in objects, a public or a social sympathy, the moral sense, and a
sense of honor. Each of these senses is primary in that none can be
reduced to a combination of the others; the pleasures and pains pro-
duced by each are unique. In particular, Hutcheson is careful to
point out that the moral sense is not a manifestation of the sense
of sympathy, for, he argues, merely to share the feelings of others
through sympathy is not to "reflect upon Virtue or Vice. " 7
According to Hutcheson, the underlying mechanism of the
moral sense, no less than those of the other senses, must remain a
mystery. The causes are hidden, but the effects are clear;
This natural Determination to approve and admire, or hate
and dislike Actions, is no doubt an occult Quality. But is
it any more mysterious that the Idea of an Action should
raise Esteem, or Contempt, than that the motion, or tearing
of Flesh should give Pleasure, or Pain; or the Act of Volition
should move Flesh and Bones? In the latter case, we have
got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and
elastic Fluids, like the Indian's Elephant, and Tortoise, to
bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go one step further.
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and you find the whole as difficult as at first, and equally
a Mystery with this Determination to love and approve, orhate and despise Actions and Agents, without any Views
of interest, as they appear benevolent, or the contrary. 8
C. D. Broad, in his important article entitled "Some Re-
flections on Moral - Sense Theories in Ethics, "9 provides a taxonomy
for moral sense theories. He shows that there are two possible
interpretations of the epistemological status of the moral sense.
The first is what he calls the "Naively Realistic Account" of the
moral sense; such an account of the moral sense is analogous to
a naively realistic account of ordinary sense perception. Roughly,
such an account holds that there are objective sensible qualities
present in external objects, independent of any perceiver, which can
be perceived just as they are through the appropriate physical sense.
On a naively realistic account of the moral sense, there exist as
objective properties of characters and actions certain ethical char-
acteristics, such as rightness, which can be apprehended directly
by the moral sense.
The alternative account of the moral sense Broad terms the
"Dispositional Account. " Here again there is an analogy with a
certain account of sense perception. The dispositional account
of sense perception denies that sensible qualities exist objectively
in external objects. Rather, to say that a thing has quality x is to
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say something like "that thing will present an x-ish appearance to
normal perceivers under standard conditions. " On a dispositional
account of the moral sense, that sense is a faculty which provides
us with unique emotions or sensations when we contemplate char-
acters and actions.
It is exceedingly difficult to stamp Hutcheson's moral sense
theoiy as either naively realistic or dispositional. Perhaps the
most incisive examination of this question is William K. Frankena's
article "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory"™; Frankena is led to
conclude there that "Hutcheson's general epistemological position
{Jis one which he] never quite explicitly formulates. " Frankena
is supported in his conclusion by Henning Jensen, who finds strains
of both types of accounts in Hutcheson;
The naively realistic side of his theory, according to which
the moral sense would cognize some empirical characteris-
tic, remains undeveloped. Worse still, a naively realistic
terminology in his moral sense doctrine conflicts with the
fact that a naively realistic theory is entirely foreign to his
general epistemological position. 11
2
What kind of moral sense theory Hutcheson holds is not
clear; but there can be no doubt that he is a moral sense theorist.
This certainty is not provided merely by Hutcheson's usage of the
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term "moral sense, " for to employ certain terminology is not in
itself to advocate a moral sense theory. Rather, the criterion of
a moral sense theory is summarized by Broad as follows:
Clt would hold] that there is a peculiar kind of experience
which human beings are liable to have when they contemplate
certain acts, and that this can take either of two oppositeforms viz.
,
a pro-form and an anti-form. [it] would hold
that this ^experience is of the nature of feeling, where
feeling" is used to include both sensation and emotion
as distinguished from thought. 12
Hutcheson is insistent on pointing out that our moral feelings are
still nobler ' and "perfectly different" from all others, a difference
of which we are immediately conscious 13
; it is this which marks him
as a moral sense theorist.
The issue I wish to turn to now is whether or not Hume holds
a moral sense theory in the Treatise
. There is little doubt that
Hume has borrowed much from Hutcheson; the question is; how
much? Those that interpret Hume as proposing a moral sense
theory in the Treatise often regard Hume as doing nothing more than
improving on Hutcheson's exposition. For example, Kemp Smith
maintains that Book III of the T reatise is a masterly restatement,
with a clarity and self-consistency beyond anything possible to
Hutcheson, of Hutcheson's own main theses .... " 14 One of these
main theses is that man is fitted with a specifically moral sense,
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which affords him a "peculiar" and unique kind of pleasure and pain.
Hutcheson is content to regard the operations of this sense
as occult ' in that, as with our physical senses, its "explanation"
must be limited to a description of initial conditions and effects.
Hume shares this same view with respect to human senses and mental
qualities:
For to me it seems evident, that the essence of mind being
equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must
be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and
qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments,
and the observation of those particular effects, which result
from its different circumstances and situations (T, p. xvii).
If Hume indeed believes that there is a moral sense, we would
expect that Book III of the Treatise could offer little more than a
detailed account of this sense's "particular effects which result
from its different circumstances and situations. " This, as we shall
see, is not the case.
It cannot be denied that Hume's terminology in Book III of
the Treatise is often that of a moral sense theory. He has even
entitled Section II of Book III "Moral distinctions deriv'd from a moral
sense. " Moreover, it seems that Hume, unlike Hutcheson, can
clearly be marked as advocating a dispositional account of the
moral sense: "Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to
sounds, colours, heat, and cold which, according to modern philos-
ophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind
(T, p. 469).
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Yet
'
1 believe that in this case we should be careful in
taking Hume at his word. Rather than relying on what he says, we
should look at what he does; and what he does, I maintain, does not
fit comfortably at all with the claim that he is advocati a moral
sense theory. A sense, for Hume, is a "primary" and "original"
faculty; though we may, through experimentation, describe the
operations of a sense in terms of general principles, for instance,
that we always perceive as such-and-such color a light of such-and-
such wavelength, we cannot resolve a sense into more basic prin-
ciples of human nature, for this would be to deny its status as a
distinct faculty. A sense is as it is, and we cannot hope to explain
it. With this in mind, I wish to draw attention to the following
passages taken from the section "Moral distinctions deriv'd from a
moral sense":
It may now be ask'd in general
,
concerning this pain or
pleasure, that distinguishes moral good and evil. From what
principles is it derived, and whence does it arise in the
human mind ? To this I reply, first
,
"that rtis absurd to"
imagine, that in every particular instance, these sentiments
are produc'd by an origina l quality and primary constitution
. . .
Such a method of proceeding is not conformable to the usual
maxims, by which nature is conducted, where a few prin-
ciples produce all that variety we observe in the universe,
and every thing is carry'd on in the easiest and most simple
manner. "Tis necessary, therefore, to abridge these
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primary impulses, and find some more general principles,
upon which all our notions of morals are founded (T, p 473)
Thus we are still brought back to our first position that
virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain,
that any action, sentiment or character gives us by the mere
view and contemplation. This decision is very commodious;
because it reduces us to this simple question. Why any
action sentiment upon_the general view or sul^ 3^ives
a certain satisfaction or uneasiness
,
in order to shew the
origin of its moral rectitude or depravity
. .
.
(T, pp 475-
It is reasonable to ask for a description of the way a certain
sense operates under certain conditions; for instance, we might ask
what we would perceive, through our sense of sight, when exposed to
light of a given wavelength. Similarly, if we assume that we possess
^ moral sense, it is legitimate to ask what feelings would be produced,
through this sense, when we consider a certain act of unprovoked
violence. But we cannot reasonably ask why a certain sense works
the way it does - it is not even clear what an answer to this question
would have to be like. We do not ask why we perceive a certain
wavelength as a certain color; we do not expect a moral sense
theorist to ask why certain actions and characters provoke the moral
sentiments that they do. Yet, Hume poses just such a question;
"Why [jdoes^ any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey,
give a certain satisfaction or uneasiness ... ?".
I will show in the following sections that Hume answers his
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own question by resolving the moral sense into some more general
principles" of human nature; he cannot be satd to countenance a
moral sense at all in the Treatise
. My argument for this will rely
on Broad's criterion for a moral sense theory, to the effect that
such a theory must hold that the moral sentiment is a feeling unlike
all others. I will show that exactly the same kind of pleasures and
pains which are for Hume, under the proper conditions, the moral
sentiments are, under other conditions, non-moral sentiments; that
is, there is no uniquely moral sentiment at all.
3
In describing the operation of a sense, we are sometimes
able to enumerate certain conditions which must obtain in order for
the sense to function. For instance, illumination is required for
the operation of our sense of sight. Hume tells us that " 'Tis only
when a character is considered in general, without reference to
our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment,
as denominates it morally good or evil" (T, p. 472). Those who
see Hume as a moral sense theorist must view this statement as
the claim that, as a matter of act, the moral sense does not operate
unless one has first adopted the moral point of view.
Unfortunately, Hume is notoriously vague in describing the
moral point of view, which he also commonly refers to as a "general
46
view or survey. At least, we know that the moral point of view
involves an "overlooking" of personal interests and desires (T,
P, 582). The pains and pleasures which derive from the satisfaction
or frustration of our personal desires, or the prospects thereof, are
not the moral sentiments. If I contemplate an action or character
in its relation to myself, according to its tendency to promote or
retard my personal welfare, the pleasures or pains which follow
will be interested" sentiments. The moral sentiment, on the other
hand, arises only upon considering an action or character in relation
to society as a whole, in which each member's interests count
equally with every other's. This is commonly called "taking an
objective viewpoint. "
There is an important point to be made here. It is obvious
that there is a difference between one's adopting the moral point
of view and one's believing that one has; the latter need not imply
the former. We see examples every day of people who have become
so habituated to a certain interested point of view that they cannot
consider matters objectively, though they make an honest effort to
do so. Yet, many such people do believe that they have adopted the
moral point of view. Consider, for instance, the majority of lawyers
who argue sincerely against no-fault insurance, or the majority
of doctors who argue sincerely against socialized medicine. I
47
think it is safe to assume that many of these people are being
influenced by personal interest, though they themselves may not
realize this. Hume shows himself to be well aware of this pos-
sibility:
Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently
concealed from ourselves when it is mingled and confounded
with other motives which the mind, from vanity or self-
conceit, it desirous of supposing more prevalent (I, p. 117).
It is important to understand that, for Hume, we must be
successful in adopting the moral point of view if we are to experience
the moral sentiment. If we believe that we have adopted the moral
point of view in a certain consideration when we in fact have not,
the pleasures and pains which may be aroused in us will be interested
sentiments, not the moral, though " 'Tis true, these sentiments, from
interest and morals, are apt to be confounded, and naturally run
into one another" (T, p. 472).
If Hume's were a moral sense theory, there could be no
further explanation of why successful adoption of the moral point of
view is a prerequisite for the operation of the moral sense; it could
be explained in no other way than to attribute it to a "primary
constitution" or "original quality" of human nature. Yet Hume does
not follow this course. We will see that Hume's statement that
"
'Tis only when a character is considered in general, without
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reference to our personal interest, that it causes such a feeling or
sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil" is not a descrip-
tion of the operation of a moral sense; it is rather a definition
(albeit incomplete) of the moral sentiment.
4
Emulating the scientist in his search for general principles,
Hume undertakes an empirical investigation of sorts; he endeavors
to compile a list of the characters or actions which tend to produce
the moral sentiment in objective observers. From his compilation,
Hume finds that all qualities of the mind" which tend to cause the
pleasurable moral sentiment can be classified as one or more of
the following 15
; those that are immediately "agreeable" to the
possessor, those that are immediately agreeable to those who come
into contact with the possessor, those that tend to be "useful" to
the possessor, and those that tend to be useful to others.
By qualities of the mind that are "immediately agreeable"
to the possessor Hume means those whose immediate sensation is
pleasant. As examples, Hume offers the following: cheerfulness,
courage, tranquillity, delicacy of taste (I, pp. 74-83). There are
other qualities which, Hume tells us, bestow "an immediate en-
joyment" or pleasure to others, "communicating, on [their] first
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appearance, a lively joy and satisfaction to everyone who has any
comprehension of [them] " «, p. 84); as examples of these Hume
lists good manners, wit, ingenuity, eloquence, modesty, decency,
cleanliness, and grace. The idea of any quality which falls under
either of these two categories tends to produce a pleasant sentiment
in us if we adopt the moral point of view.
By "useful” Hume means contributing to happiness and welfare.
Some qualities of mind tend to be useful to their possessor, such as
pride, perseverance, patience, vigilance, and frugality. The ideas
of these qualities too produce the pleasant moral sentiment in an
objective observer. Some qualities tend to be useful in promoting
the welfare of society at large, such as benevolence, honesty, and
fidelity. It is with respect to this category that Hume introduces a
distinction between what he calls "natural" and "artificial" virtues.
A natural virtue is a quality of mind which is one of the following:
it is immediately agreeable to the possessor, it is immediately
agreeable to others, it tends to prompt actions which are useful
to the possessor or others, independently of the actions of others.
Some actions, however, are useful to society only within the context
of an accepted system of conventional behavior. This system finds
expression in our laws of property which, Hume believes, define
the limits of justice and injustice.
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The only difference betwixt the natural virtues and justice
lies in this, that the good, which results from the former
arises from every single act, and is the object of some
natural passion; Whereas a single act of justice, consider'd
in itself, may often be contrary to the public good; and »tis
only the concurrence of mankind, in a general scheme or
system of action, which is advantageous
. . . and 'twas with
a view to this advantage, that men, by their voluntary
conventions, establish'd it (T; p. 579).
Hume believes that initially there is no human propensity toward
acts of justice as such; there is only a view to self-interest. How-
ever, men come to see that certain mutually accepted conventions
are essential to the furtherance of this self-interest. Once this
system is established, there can be developed in us a certain quality
of mind or inclination to perform acts of justice for their own sake.
As with the former three types of mental qualities, we experience
a pleasant sentiment if we contemplate, from the moral point of
view, a quality of mind which tends to prompt actions which promote
the welfare of society, either "naturally" or "artificially" (as a
contributor to the system of justice).
These categories are not mutually exclusive. Cheerfulness,
in addition to being pleasant to the possessor, conveys an immediate
satisfaction to others in contact with the possessor; and benevolence,
according to Hume, is pleasant to the possessor as well as being
useful to others.
The question Hume poses is this; by what principles do
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such types of mental qualities cause in us a pleasant sentiment when
contemplated from the moral point of view? Hume's solution is
prompted by a more careful consideration of those qualities of mind
which are useful, either to the possessor or to others. Hume sets
the stage as follows. We experience pleasant sentiments when we
observe or contemplate actions which we believe will promote our
own welfare. This is accounted for by self-interest. But there are
cases where we ignore our own interests and desires, by adopting
the moral point of view, and still receive a pleasure from observing
or contemplating actions or characters which tend to be useful to
others. How can this be? Hume’s answer is the principle of sympathy,
the "true origin of morals" (T, p. 575).
Now as the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the
end is agreeable; and as the good of society, where our own
interest is not concern'd, or that of our friends, please
oniy by sympathy; It follows, that sympathy is the source
of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues
Thus it appears, that sympathy is a very powerful principle
in human nature
. . . and that it produces our sentiment of
morals in all the artificial virtues. From thence we may
presume that it also gives rise to many of the other virtues;
and that qualities acquire our approbation, because of their
tendency to the good of mankind (T, pp. 577-578).
Hume then considers those qualities of mind which are
immediately agreeable to the possessor or to others; he finds that
here too sympathy is essential to an explanation of how a pleasant
l
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sentiment can be aroused from a non-interested consideration of
these qualities. In each case, the pleasure we receive from a non
interested view of the pleasure of others can only be explained by
an appeal to sympathy:
The person is a stranger; I am in no way interested in him
nor lie under any obligation to him: His happiness concerns
not me, farther than the happiness of every human, and
indeed of every sensible creature; That is, it affects me
only by sympathy. From that principle, whenever I discover
his happiness and good, whether in its causes or effects,
I enter so deeply into it, that it gives me a sensible emotion
(T, pp. 588-589).
Hume takes few pains to conceal his feeling of self-satis-
faction with his appeal to sympathy to account for the pleasant
sentiments associated with those qualities of mind commonly called
"virtues":
'Tis very happy, in our philosophical researches, when we
find the same phaenomenon diversified b}^ a variety of cir-
cumstances; and by discovering what is common among them,
can the better assure ourselves of the truth of any hypothesis
we may make use of to explain it. Were nothing esteem'd
virtue but what were beneficial to society, I am persuaded,
that the foregoing explication of the moral sense (viz.
,
in terms of sympathy] ought still to be receiv'd, and that
upon sufficient evidence; But this evidence must grow upon
us, when we find other kinds of virtue, which will not admit
of any explication except from that hypothesis (T, p. 588).
Unfortunately, Hume's good feelings might have diminished
considerably had he realized the seriousness of the ambiguity with
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which he would burden future readers. The difficulty lies in deter-
mining the nature of the relationship between a sympathetic sentiment
moral sentiment. Hume, it is true, does clearly tell us that
sympathy "produces our sentiment of morals" (T, p. 577 ), that
sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions" (T, p. 618),
that "To that principle [viz. sympathy]
, therefore, we are to
ascribe the sentiment of approbation, which arises from the survey
of all those virtues, that are useful to society, or to the person
possess'd of them" (T, p. 619). The crucial question is: is the
sentiment derived from sympathy merely a cause of the moral
sentiment, or is it identical to the moral sentiment? In attempting
to answer this question, it is necessary to examine the nature of
Humean sympathy in detail.
5
Concerning sympathy, which is the human ability to "receive
by communication another's inclinations and sentiments, " Hume
believes that "No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both
in itself, and in its consequences" (T, p. 316).
To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity
we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those
of the same nation ... A good-natur'd man finds himself in
an instant of the same humour with his company; and even
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the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their
countrymen and acquaintance. A chearful countenance
infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind;
as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon
me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth
and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from com-
munication than from my own natural temper and disposi-
tion (T, pp. 316-317).
But Hume is not content to pass off our ability to sympathize as
an "occult" quality; rather, he insists that sympathy "must be
trac'd up to its first principles" (T, p. 317).
The first principles to which Hume is led involve the re-
lationship between ideas and impressions, and the possibility of
the conversion of the former to the latter. No one of us can ex-
perience directly the impression of another's passion. What we can
observe is "external signs in the countenance and conversation"
(T, p. 317). We know from our own personal experience that we
tend to exhibit a certain set of external signs when we are ex-
periencing a certain passion. Thus, according to Hume, we come
to associate the ideas of certain passions with certain signs. When
we observe certain signs in another, we come to have, via the
process of association (which "operates in so silent and im-
perceptible a manner, that we are scarce sensible of it" (T, p. 305)),
the idea of the appropriate passion. At this point, however, we still
conceive of the passion as belonging to the other person (T, p. 319),
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and hence the vivacity of our idea of this passion will be a function
of the vivacity of our idea of that person.
It is a corollary to Hume's principle of association that an
impression will "infuse" a like degree of vivacity or intensity on a
closely related idea. Hume claims, ;n his discussion of sympathy,
that
'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of our-
selves is always intimately present with us, and that our
consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own
person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that anything
can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object,
thei efore, is related to ourselves must be conceived with
a like vivacity of conception
... (T, p. 317).
Because the impression of one's self is so vivid, the ideas of
objects which are associated with ourselves will be more or less
intense, depending on the strength of the association. Two im-
portant factors in determining the strength of such an association
are resemblance and contiguity; that is, we tend to "identify" more
with objects that resemble us, and which are near to us in space
or time. We tend to more closely associate the idea of ourselves
with the idea of an animal than with the idea of an inanimate object;
within the animal kingdom itself we tend to form closer or more
distant associations, depending on the degree of resemblance born
to us. Even in the case of human beings, the force with which we
associate the idea of another person with the idea of ourselves is
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increased where that person resembles ns in "manners, or character
or language" (T, p. 318), and where that person is near to us in
distance or time:
The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any
object, the more easily does the imagination make the
transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of
conception, with which we always form the idea of our
own person (T, p. 318).
When we sympathize with another person, then, we first
receive the idea of that person exhibiting certain signs (either from
direct observation, or from some other indirect information). We
are carried thence to an idea of a passion as affecting that person.
This idea will be more or less intense, depending on the degree
of association which binds that person to ourselves. If this associa-
tion is of sufficient degree, the intensity with which we conceive of
ourselves will be transmitted to our idea of the other person, and
to our idea of his passion, and in so doing "This flatter] idea is
presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree
of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and
produce an equal emotion, as any original affection" (T, p. 317).
"This is the nature and cause of sympathy" (T, p. 319).
Based on this description of sympathy as "nothing but a
lively idea converted into an impression" (T, pp. 385-386), Hume
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explains how we can sympathize with passions which are non-
existent. For example, if I should come upon a person in tears, I
am immediately carried to a lively idea of the sorrow which I
imagine to be affecting that person, and which may be "inliven'd"
to such a degree as to become the very sorrow itself. This
mechanism would be unaffected if, unbeknownst to me, I were witnes-
sing tears of joy rather than of sorrow.
Similarly, I am able to sympathize with passions that I
conceive to affect a person at a later time;
For supposing I saw a person perfectly unknown to me, who,
while asleep in the fields, was in danger of being trod
under foot by horses, I shou'd immediately run to his as-
sistance; and in this I shou'd be actuated by the same
principle of sympathy, which makes me concern'd for the
present sorrows of a stranger
. . .
Sympathy being nothing
but a lively idea converted into an impression, 'tis evident,
that, in considering the future possible or probable condition
of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a con-
ception as to make it our own concern; and by that means be
sensible of pains and pleasures, which neither belong to
ourselves, nor at the present instant have any real existence
(T, pp. 385-386).
Although my concern here is not with an appraisal of Hume's
principle of sympathy as such, it would be inappropriate to pass
over its examination without at least pointing out some of its severe
difficulties. As we have seen, Hume's account of sympathy, which
appears in Book II of the Treatise, relies on his contention that "the
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idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present
with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception
of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing
in this particular can go beyond it. " But in this Hume flatly con-
tradicts that for which he so carefully'argues in Book I, in his
section "Of personal identity. "
There are some philosophers [amusingly enough, the Hume
of Book II is one of them]
,
who imagine we are every moment
intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel
its existence and its continuance in existence; and are
certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its
perfect identity and simplicity
. . . Unluckily all these
positive assertions are contrary to that very experience,
which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self,
after the manner it is here explain'd (T, p. 251).
I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are
nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions,
which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity
There is properly no simplicity in the mind at one time,
nor identity in different
. . . They are the successive per-
ceptions only, that constitutes the mind; nor have we the
most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are
represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd"
(T, pp. 252-253).
Kemp Smith argues that there is some evidence that Hume
is aware of this inconsistency. ^ Smith points to Hume's use, in
his account of sympathy, of the phrase "our consciousness gives us
so lively a conception of our own person, " which Smith finds to be
"cumbersome" and "non-committal" when compared with the more
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definite phrase "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves"
(T, p. 317). Says Smith, "it is natural to suppose that his later
uneasy awareness of the contradiction between the two Books has
necessitated these alternative wordings. " In any case, Hume's
awareness has not, in the Treatise
,
prompted him to resolve the
difficulty, (see T, pp. 635-636) and his account of sympathy suffers
because of it.
I have alluded to the second difficulty in my second chapter:
the distinction between impressions and ideas. I pointed out that
Hume's several pronouncements that the only "original difference"
between impressions and ideas is degree of vivacity is belied by his
account of belief, wherein an idea, though augmented in intensity
to a level of an impression, retains its identity as an idea. In
sympathy, however, the conversion from idea to impression does
take place. Hume admits that this difference in the capacities of
belief and sympathy is "surprising and extraordinary" (T, p. 320),
but he offers nothing in his account of sympathy which helps to
explain this difference.
Finally, it is interesting to note the sequence of explanations
which can be traced in the Treatise. Hume attempts to account for
our moral sentiments by appealing to a principle more basic:
sympathy. Again, Hume insists on tracing sympathy to its "first
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principles. " This leads him to the principle of association, which
is developed in Book I. At first, Hume pretends to be content
to seek no further for principles more basic than that of association;
Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world
will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural,
and to shew itself in as many and as various forms. Its
effects are everywhere conspicuous; but as to its causes,
they are mostly unknown, and must be resolv'd into original
qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain”
Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to
restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes
into obscure and uncertain speculations (T, pp. 12-13).
Sadly enough, Hume's self-restraint is not complete. Only a few
sections later, he can't help admitting that M 'Twou'd have been easy
to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shewn,
why upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into
all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas, that are
related to it" (T, p. 60). Sadder yet, Hume then proceeds to
give just such an anatomy lesson in explaining how certain errors
in reasoning occur.
6
What, then, is the relationship between the moral sentiment
and sympathy? Hume tells us he is seeking to resolve the moral
sense into "some more general principles" (T, p. 473); later, we are
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told that sympathy "produces our sentiment of morals in all the
artificial virtues
. . . also gives rise to many of the other virtues"
(T, pp. 577-578), that sympathy provides an "explication of the
moral sense" (T, p. 588), that "sympathy is the chief source of
moral distinctions" (T, p. 618). From such statements, and from
the general tenor of Hume's exposition, one might be led to interpret
Hume as equating moral sentiments with sympathetic sentiments.
On such an interpretation, the moral sense is nothing more than
the human ability to sympathize.
Such an interpretation is given by Ingemar Hedenius.
Hedenius holds that Hume's attempt to "reduce the moral sense to
a more general principle, that of sympathy, inevitably leads to an
interpretation of all sympathy as moral approval or disapproval. "18
On Hedenius' interpretation, for one to experience a moral feeling,
or the moral sentiment, is for one to experience "a sympathetic
consciousness of the pleasure or pain of others. "18 Hume does seem
to be saying just that in several places. For example, immediately
after telling us that "the distinction of vice and virtue
. . .
has also
a considerable dependence on the principle of sympathy so often
insisted on, " Hume gives an explanation as follows:
Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which
gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which
produces pain, is call'd vicious. This pleasure and this
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pain may arise from four different sources. For we reap
a pleasure from the view of a character, which is naturally
itted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or
which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself
(T, p. 591)
Hume then points out in several places that "the happiness of
strangers affects us by sympathy alone" (T, p. 619). Thus, Hume
seems to be saying, when I contemplate a certain quality of mind or
character, I consider its likely (or actual) effects on its possessor
and on others; and in sharing their pleasures or pains through
sympathy, I am thereby experiencing the moral sentiment.
Contrary to Hedenius, I do not believe that Hume ever held
such a view. Hume holds that we cannot experience the moral
sentiment unless we first take the moral point of view. Certainly,
however, we can sympathize with others without taking the moral
point of view; in fact, Hume insists that we sympathize more with
loved ones and close acquaintances than with strangers. Hence,
the moral sentiment cannot be identified with sympathetic sentiment.
Hume also tells us that we are able to sympathize with animals
(T, p. 481). Imagine the situation, then, in which we are contem-
plating the character of a dog which has a habit of mauling cats.
We consider the pain and terror of his victims, and experience
similar feelings through sympathy. If moral sentiments were no
more than sympathetic sentiments, we must be said to be experiencing
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the former in the present case. But Hume believes that it is
only the characters of human beings which can arouse in us the
moral sentiment.
Finally, we must remember that Hume holds that a moral
sentiment is a "peculiar" kind of pleasure or pain. However, sym-
pathy extends, not only to (non-sensational) pleasures and pains, but
to all the passions, direct and indirect.
The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and
operations, nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of
which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As
in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates
itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one
person to another, and beget correspondent movements
in every human creature (T, pp. 575-576).
When I sympathize with a person in his anger, according to Hume,
I feel anger; when I sympathize with a person in his joy, I too am
joyful. Through sympathy, I come to experience passions; but,
though Hume tells us that the experience of each passion is, in its
own way, pleasant or unpleasant (T, p. 590), passions are not
themselves pleasures or pains. Thus, the feelings that I experience
through sympathy cannot, in general, be moral sentiments.
If Hume does not mean to identify moral sentiments with
sympathetic sentiments, what does he mean to do? Most commen-
tators conclude that sympathetic feelings do not constitute moral
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sentiments, but rather are causal elements in the production of
moral sentiments by the moral sense. My sympathy allows me to
share the unpleasant emotional effects which are visited upon those
who come into contact with a cruel character, and my sympathetic
feelings induce in me, via the moral sense, an unpleasant moral
sentiment. The moral sense remains a mysterious faculty; there
IS no explanation of how or why our sympathetic feelings trigger
this moral sense, or why sympathetic feelings experienced outside
the moral point of view do not. Nevertheless, this is the view which,
for instance, Kemp Smith seems to attribute to Hume. I use here
the word "seems" because Smith's account, like that of most
others, is extremely vague on the relationship between sympathy and
the moral sentiment. For instance, in Smith's section entitled
The Moral Effects of Sympathy, " we find the following explanation:
«>
What [Hume] is maintaining is that sympathy ... is a
univer sal influence, as being the influence that renders man
the specific type of creature that he is, namely, a creature
so essentially social that even in his most self-regarding
passions sympathy keeps others no less than the self
constantly before the mind. It 'give Os] U s the same
pleasure, and therefore a pleasure that counts together with
our own in our estimates of advantage and loss, and so
ultimately also in our moral judgments of approval and
disapproval. 20
A bit further on. Smith continues:
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The verdict [viz.
,
in a moral judgment] is owing to thepeculiar fabric and constitution of our species; and inparticuiar to the operation of sympathy, whereby we enterinto the sufferings of others as into suffering of our own. 21
But this interpretation does not answer the questions that
Hume believes need answering:
"it may now be ask'd in general
,
concerning this pain or pleasure, that distinguishes moral good and
evil. From what principles is it derived, and whence does it arise
in the human mind?" "Why [does] any action or sentiment upon
the general view of survey, give a certain satisfaction or un-
easiness?" To find only that sympathetic feelings are necessary
to trigger a mysterious moral sense is not to "discover the true
origin of morals, "nor does it explain how"sympathy is the chief
source or moral distinctions. " I think Hume, in the Treatise
,
has
given us far more than a description of the initial conditions neces-
sary for the operation of the moral sense; I think he tells us what the
moral sense is, and, true to his word, finds "some more general
principles, upon which all our notions of morals are founded. "
As it turns out, there is for Hume no unique moral sense at all;
what there is will be examined in the following section.
7
For Hume, it is only qualities of mind or characters which
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can accurately be said to be virtuous or vicious
Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard
only the motives that produced them, and consider the
actions as signs or indications of certain principles in
the mind and temper
... the ultimate object of our praise
and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them (T, p. 417).
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a
sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon
durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole
conduct, and enter into the personal character (T, p. 575)
But a quality of mind for Hume is nothing but a tendency or disposi-
tion to behave in certain ways or to have certain passions; in them-
selves, such dispositions are not "real existences" which can be
perceived in any direct way through the physical senses. Hence,
according to Hume, we have no idea of mental qualities or characters
independent of their expected behaviorial consequences; we can
contemplate a mantal quality or character only by contemplating
certain actions or passions which we associate with that quality.
This is why Hume says that "Virtue is consider'd as means to an
end ' (T, p. 619); a virtue, being a mental disposition, is nothing
independent of its behaviorial consequences (real or imagined).
Thus, even if there were a uniquely moral sense, it could be
affected only by ideas of those behaviors or passions which we associ-
ate with certain mental qualities. But now Hume makes a very
important point:
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Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have no
friendship, pleases us only by sympathy (T, p. 576).
. . . the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the
end is agreeable; and
. . . the good of society, where our own
interest is not concern'd or that of our friends, pleases
only by sympathy
... (T, p. 577).
. . .
the public good is indifferent to us, except so far as
sympathy interests us in it (T, p. 618).
. . .
the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone
(T, p. 619).
Hume is saying that if we overlook our own personal desires, and
suppress the enlivening power of sympathy, there is no way that the
observation or contemplation of the emotional condition of others
can emotionally affect us. How different this is from Hutcheson, for
whom the moral sense is "a Determination of our Minds to receive
amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when they occur to our
Observation, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss to
redound to our selves from them" (italics mine). For Hutcheson,
the idea of actions (inclusive of consequences) pleases or displeases
us directly, through the moral sense. If Hume is truly a moral
sense theorist, why cannot his moral sense operate without the
intervention of sympathy? We could conclude with Kemp Smith that,
for Hume, that is just the way it is, "owing to the peculiar fabric
and constitution of our species. "^2 But there is a better answer.
The key to what I take to be the proper interpretation of Hume
is found in the following two passages which, because of their
importance, I will quote at length:
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Now 1 tis certain, there are certain calm desires and ten-
dencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little
emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects
than by the immediate feeling or sensation. The ss desires
are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally im-
planted in our natures, such as benevolence and resent-
ment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the
genera l appetite to good (viz.
,
pleasure]
,
and aversion to
_evil [viz.
,
pain] consider'd merely as sucTT7t71x^T 7;
_
italics mine).
"Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or
pleasure from any objec t, we feel a consequent emotion of
aversion or propensity, and are" carry 1 d to avoid or embrace
what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction
. 'Tis also
obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us
cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects
are connected with its original one by the relation of cause
and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover
this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our
actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident
in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but
is only directed by it. 'Tis from the prospect of pain or
pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any
object : And these emotions extend themselves to the causes
and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by
reason and experience (T, p. 414; italics mine).
That is, human beings are naturally constituted so that the idea of
personal pleasure tends to induce a feeling of satisfaction or
"propensity, " while the idea of personal pain tends to induce a feeling
of uneasiness or "aversion. " These feelings, through a process of
association based on cause and effect relationships, come to be
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directed toward the causes of our anticipated pleasures or pains.
Hume also points out that the case is the same where the pleasures
or pains arc actual rather than imagined*
The mind by an original instinct tends to unite itself with
the good, and to avoid the evil, tho' they be conceived merely
in idea, and be consider'd as to exist in any future Hod
of time. But supposing that there is an immedi aression
of pain or pleasure, and that arising from an object related
to ourselves or others, this does not prevent the propensity
or aversion
. . . That propensity, which unites us to the
object, or separates us from it, still continues to operate
(T, pp. 438-439).
I want to argue that this "consequent emotion of aversion or
propensity, " this "uneasiness or satisfaction, " to which Hume refers
is itself, when generated under the proper conditions, defined to be
the moral sentiment, and that there is no moral sense properly so
called. The proper conditions are; adopting the moral point of view
(i. e.
,
ignoring personal interests and desires ana considering the
effects of behaviors and actions on society at large), and sympathiz-
ing with society at large.
Hume is not stipulating this definition of the moral sentiment,
nor is it taken to be an expression of what Hume calls a "relation
of ideas, " or a necessary truth. Rather, it is what might be called
a "definition in use, " which Hume discovers in his "experiments
. . .
from a cautious observation of human life ... as they appear in the
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common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in
affairs, and in their pleasures" (T, p. xix). Hume is claiming that,
in fact, when men, both in the past and present, have referred to
moral sentiments, they have referred to this aversion or propensity,
generated under the proper conditions. We see the same sort of
empirical derivation of a definition in Hume's discussion of cause
and effect. Hume’s definition (actually, he gives two) of cause is
obtained by examining "with the utmost accuracy those objects,
which are commonly denominated causes and effects" (T, p. 170)
How does the moral sentiment come about? For example,
suppose I dislike milk and my host places before me what I take to
be a glass of that liquid. My idea of the unpleasant taste produces
in me an aversion, which becomes directed at the milk itself. This
is an interested sentiment, proceeding as it does from my personal
dislike for milk. Or, suppose my friend is in the habit of stealing.
I might taxe a very limited view of the situation, and sympathize
only with the pleasures my friend receives from his actions. In so
doing, I experience pleasure myself, which becomes the object
of an emotional propensity or attraction. The "object" which affords
me this sympathetic pleasure is my friend, whose criminal nature
disposes him to commit these crimes which accrue to his advantage.
Thus, my propensity soon directs itself to my friend, and to his
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penchant for mischief. Again, however, this propensity is not the
moral sentiment, for it proceeds not from the moral point of view,
a view which considers the interests of all.
If, in this example, I extend my view to include the victims
of my friend, the disagreeable feelings I experience in sympathy with
them will (most likely) outweigh the agreeable feelings I experience
in sympathy with my friend, and a feeling of aversion will arise in
me, which will soon "extend" to my friend's character. This, then,
is a moral sentiment: it is an emotional reaction to unpleasant
feelings which I experience as a result of a sympathy extended by
the moral point of view.
This new interpretation of the moral sentiment explains much
of what has been unclear in Hume. No longer do we see Hume as
postulating the existence of some mysterious faculty called the "moral
sense. " Moral distinctions are now seen to be rooted in nothing
more mysterious than the well-known human instinct to be attracted
to pleasant feelings and repelled by unpleasant ones. Rather than
merely giving conditions for the activation of a moral sense, we see
that Hume really does resolve the moral sense itself into principles
more general.
No longer must it remain unexplained why adoption of the
moral point of view is necessary for the experiencing of the moral
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sentiment. Hume has told us that "
' Tis only when a character is
considered in general, without reference to our particular interest,
tnat it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally
good or evil" (T, p. 472). As long as we understand Hume to be
holding a moral sense theory, this statement must be taken as
empirical, a mere description of that "peculiar fabric and consti-
tution of our species. " On my interpretation, however, Hume's
statement is seen to be a definition; and no longer need we wonder
why we can't experience the moral sentiment unless we first adopt
the moral point of view.
There are a number of other areas that lend themselves to
the present interpretation. According to Hume, "the general appe-
tite to good, and aversion to evil" which, I maintain, constitute
the moral sentiments under the proper conditions,
tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind,
and are more known by their effects than by the immediate
feeling or sensation
. .
they are very readily taken for the
determinations of reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from
the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and false-
hood. Their nature and principles have been suppos'd the
same, because their sensations are not evidently different
(T, p. 417).
Significantly, Hume later makes this same point when he is dealing
specifically with the moral sentiment:
Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd of;
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llccli x caemoiance to each other (T, p. 470).
Hume makes the statement that " 'Tis true, those sentiments.
from interest and morals, are apt to be confounded, and naturally
run into one another" (T, p. 472). This also adapts well to my
interpretation. My feeling of aversion toward the glass of milk was
the same kind of impression as my aversion toward my friend's
criminal nature, and thus these impressions feel the same. Yet,
the first impression is an interested sentiment whereas the second
is a moral sentiment; they are differentiated only by the conditions
of their genesis. A man "of temper and judgment, " as Hume describes
him, is more aware of when he has managed to overlook his own
personal interests and consider the interests of all, and thus is
better able to judge when his feeling of aversion or propensity is a
moral or an interested sentiment. A less careful man is apt to
get these sentiments "confounded. "
For Hutcheson, the moral sense is a distinct God-given
faculty which affords a unique kind of pleasure or pain upon the
view of certain types of human behavior: those which display (or
deny) benevolence. God could have designed our moral sense
differently, however. For instance, as Hutcheson discusses in
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ion
one of lus examples, our moral sense might have been constructed
so as to afford us pleasure from the view of malice rather than
that of benevolence. Hutcheson realizes that this raises the questi
of whether or not one type of moral sense could be considered to
be (non-morally) preferable to another; he concludes that there must
be such a preference, based on a particular moral sense's con-
formability to the more fundamental human disposition to be
attracted to pleasure and repelled by pain:
A Sense approving Benevolence would disapprove that Temper,
which a Sense approving Malice would delight in.
. . Any
rational Nature observing two Men thus constituted, with
opposite Senses, might by reasoning see, not moral Goodness
in one Sense more than in the contrary, but a Tendency to
the Happiness of the Person himself, who had the former
Sense in the one Constitution, and a contrary Tendency in
the opposite Constitution; nay, the Persons themselves might
observe this
. . . Thus one Constitution of the moral Sense"
might appear to be more advantageous to those who had it,
than the contrary; as we may call that Sense of Tasting
healthful, which made wholsome Meat pleasant; and we would
call a contrary Taste pernicious. ^3
But Hume, on my interpretation, has no need to show that
our moral sense, as actually constituted, accords with our natural
propensity toward pleasure because this sense is resolved into our
basic emotional reaction to pleasure and pain, conditioned in the
proper way by a general sympathy. Hume seems to be making
this point in the following passage taken from the section entitled
"Conclusion of this book, "and there can be little doubt that he has
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Hutcheson in mind here.
Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts
of the human mind [for instance, Hutcheson], may defend thecause of virtue with sufficient authority; but' want the advan-tage which those possess, who account for that sense by an
extensive sympathy with mankind. According to their
system, not only virtue must be approv'd of, but also the
sense of virtue; And not only that sense, but also the
principles, from whence it is deriv'd. So that nothing ispresented on any side, but what is laudable and good
^
(T, p. 619) *
This resolution of the moral sense into an interplay between
two of the most basic principles of human nature, sympathy and the
natural emotional reaction to pleasure and pain, is quite in the spirit
of Hume, who is constantly seeking for hypotheses susceptible to
Occam's razor. The following are examples of Hume's many
references to the need for keeping the number of basic principles
to a minimum.
Besides, we find in the course of nature, that tho' the
effects be many, the principles, from which they arise, are
commonly but few and simple, and that 'tis the sign of an
unskillful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality,
in order to explain every different operation. How much
more must this be true with regard to the human mind
To invent without scruple a new principle to every new
phaenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to over-
load our hypotheses with a variety of this kind; are certain
proofs, that none of these principles is the just one, and
that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover
our ignorance of the truth (T, p. 282).
. . .
'tis absurd to imagine, that in every particular instance.
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these moral sentiments are produc'd by an original qualityand primary constitution
. . . Such a method off^ee dim, i snot conformable to the usual maxims, by which nature is’
conducted, where a few principles produce all that varietywe observe in the universe, and every thing is carry'd onin the easiest and most simple manner (T, p. 473)
There is no need to postulate the existence of a separate sense
or faculty in order to account for moral sentiments; Book III of
the Treati_s_e is Hume's attempt to show how this can be done by
appealing only to the principles of sympathy and the instinctive
human reactions to pleasure and pain.
Where, then, does Hume's moral sentiment, as I've inter-
preted it, belong in his classification of the impressions? As I
tried to show earlier, Hume seems to contradict himself in attempting
to maintain that the moral sentiment is both a kind of pleasure (or
pain) and a passion. Unfortunately, there is nothing in my inter-
pretation which eases this inconsistency.
The moral sentiment, on my interpretation, has all the marks
of a passion. Most important of these is that the moral sentiment
has an object - it is an aversion or propensity to something. Of the
two kinds of impressions, those of sensation and those of reflection
(the passions), only the latter are said to have an object for Hume.
Moreover, the moral sentiment seems to be a direct passion, for it
arises directly (i. e.
,
without the operation of the principle of the
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association of ideas or that of the association of impressions)
from pleasure or pain, actual or contemplated; "By direct passions
I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from
pain or pleasure (T, p. 276). As such, the moral sentiment can-
not be a kind of pleasure or pain, as Hume so often insists, though
its sensation, as that of all passions, may be pleasant or pain ml.
Thus, the difficulty of placing the moral sentiment in his scheme of
impressions remains a crucial problem for Hume.
9
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CHAPTER IV
THE DOMAIN OF MORAL SUBJECTS
1
There are a few occasions whore Hume seems to equate the
moral sentiment with a sentiment of moral praise or blame. For
instance.
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satis-
faction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a
character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or ad-
miration (T, p. 471).
This, as it turns out, is a misleading statement of Hume's position,
which is more clearly stated here:
The pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey
or view of any action or quality of mind, constitutes its vice
or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame, which
is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred
T, p. 614; second set of italics mine)
The object of love or hate, Hume has told us, is always another
person; thus, moral praise or blame, it would seem, is always
directed at another person. Yet clearly Hume would allow that we
often morally praise or blame ourselves; but Hume has told us that
love aid hate are always directed at another (T, p. 329). However,
pride and humility are closely related to love and hate, and are
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directed at our selves. We might paraphrase Hume, then, by
describing mora! self approbation or blame as nothing but a fainter
and more imperceptible pride or humility. The cause of an indirect
passion is always a "separate pleasure or uneasiness, " which is
closely associated with the object of the passion. Such pleasures and
pains, as we have seen, often stem from the satisfaction of personal
desires. But only if the pleasure or pain is a moral sentiment, as
described in the last chapter, will the consequent love or hate (or
pride or humility) be mora l praise or blame.
Ultimately, Hume relies on an entity's potential for becoming
an object of love or hate in order to determine the domain of moral
subjects. Consider the moral sentiment as I have so far described
it: it is the pleasure of an attraction or the pain of an aversion
toward the ultimate cause of a sympathetic pleasure or pain, con-
sequent to the adoption of the moral point of view. But this would let
in too much to satisfy Hume, for this would allow moral sentiments
to be directed toward inanimate objects and animals. 1 Let us imagine
a robot, programmed to maim innocent people. We might adopt
the moral point of view, and in sympathizing with the victims we
experience painful sentiments; our aversion to our painful feelings
is soon directed, via a chain of cause and effect reasoning, to the
robot itself. Or, we might imagine a wild tiger to take the place of
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the i obot in the example. By a similar process, we come to ex-
perience toward the tiger that peculiar kind of pain which, according
to Hume, constitutes aversion.
The question then arises of whether or not Hume will allow
inanimate objects and animals to be subject to moral distinctions;
or, to put it in another way, will Hume allow our aversion in these
examples to be counted as a moral sentiment? At first, it appears
that such a decision must be arbitrary; but Hume finds a criterion
that gives him the basis for an answer. In his view, it is a contra-
diction for an object to be potentially virtuous or vicious and not be
potentially an object of moral praise or blame. For instance, in
denying that individual actions can have moral value, Hume gives
as the reason that individual actions "have no influence on love or
hatred, pride or humility" (T, p. 575). The hidden premise is
that what cannot be the object of love, hatred, pr ide, or humility
(and hence what cannot be the object of moral praise or blame)
cannot be virtuous or vicious. But Hume holds that only people can
be the objects of love or hate, pride or humility. Since, then, in-
animate objects and animals cannot be the objects of moral praise
or blame, they cannot, on Hume's assumption, be virtuous or
vicious; and propensities or aversions directed toward them cannot
be counted as moral sentiments. Thus, Hume has added a further
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condition to his (implicit) definition of the moral sentiment: it
must be directed toward another human being. We find this condition
stated in the following passage;
Pride and humility, love and hatred are excited, when there
is any thing presented to us, that both bears a relation to
the object of the passion, and produces a separate sensation
related to the sensation of the passion. Now virtue and vice
are attended with these circumstances. They must neces-
sarily bp Plac'd either in ourselve s or others, Imd" excite
either pleasure or uneasiness; and therefore must give rise
to one of these four passions; which clearly distinguishes
them from the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate
objects, that often bear no relation to us
: And this is,
perhaps, the most considerable effect that virtue and vice
have upon the human mind (T, p. 473; italics mine).
There is yet a further restriction on what can count as a
moral sentiment, and again it stems from the "original" restrictions
on the indirect passions of love and hate. As we saw in my earlier
discussion of these passions, the pleasure or pain caused in me must
be strongly associated in idea with another person in order to cause
in me love or hate. The case is the same with that love or hate
which constitutes moral praise or blame. Imagine that I witness a
hunter accidentally shoot his companion. I might take the moral
point of view, and experience painful sentiments in sympathy with
the injured man; my aversion soon directs itself to the ultimate
cause of my uneasiness, namely, the first hunter. This aversion,
it would seem, is a moral sentiment. This is not the case however.
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Unless this pain of aversion can be strongly associated with
the first hunter, it cannot cause in me the passion of hate. Because
the shooting was accidental, and did not proceed from any character
trait or intention in the first hunter, my pain is not closely associated
with the hunter - no hate, or blame, ensues. My aversion is not a
moral sentiment:
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 1 tis only as a
sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon
durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole
conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions
themselves
,
not proceeding from any constant prlncIpTeT have
no influence on love o r hatred, pride or humility; and
consequently are never consider'd in morality
. . . This
reflexion is self-evident, and deserves to be attended to,
as being of the utmost importance in the present subject.
We are never to consider any single action in our enquiries
concerning the origin of morals; but only the quality or
character from which the action proceeded. These alone
are dura ble enough to affect our sentiments concerning the
person (T, p. 575; second set of italics mine).
If I suspected that the shooting was intentional, or resulted from
a habit of carelessness, the relevant association might become strong
enough to cause hate; my feeling of aversion would then count as a
moral sentiment, and my feeling of hate as moral blame.
Hume defines a virtue in terms of its potential for causing a
moral sentiment. A virtue is "whatever mental quality in ourselves
or others [which"] gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflexion, "
and a vice is a mental quality that "gives uneasiness" in the same
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manner (T, p. 575). Implicit in this definition of virtue are the
conditions for the moral sentiment which I have developed above: it
must be directed toward a person, it must be traceable to a mental
trait of that person, and it must proceed from a sympathy widened
in scope by the moral point of view. •
2
A virtue, then, is any quality of mind which, when contem-
plated from the moral point of view, causes a certain satisfaction,
and where this satisfaction stems directly from the experience of
pleasant sympathetic feelings. As a result of this definition, Hume
finds that many qualities of mind which are usually taken to be with-
out moral value must now be counted as virtues. Such traits are
commonly called "natural abilities"; among those that Hume mentions
are good sense, genius, wit, humor, patience, resolution, and
industry. An analogous situation obtains for what might ordinarily
be called "natural disabilities, " such as "prodigality, luxury,
irresolution, and uncertainty (T, p. 611). These now must be
counted as vices.
Upon examination, Hume finds that all traits which are con-
sidered as natural abilities share one or more of the following
characteristics: they are useful to the possessor (as is wisdom).
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they are immediately agreeable to the possessor (as is good humor),
they are useful to others (as is genius), or they are immediately
agreeable to others (as is wit). In this respect, at least, natural
abilities cannot be distinguished from those traits commonly taken
to be virtues. Moreover, if we adopt the moral point of view, and
allow ourselves a general sympathy with the possessor of a natural
ability and the people he affects, we find that we experience the
pleasure of a propensity or attraction - and all the necessary con-
ditions are met in order to christen this pleasure a moral sentiment.
The mechanism here is exactly the same as we have already found
for those mental qualities which are normally taken to be virtues.
We get a similar situation in the production of aversion from the
natural disabilities. Also, as in the case of virtue proper, our
pleasure of attraction can cause love, and our pain of aversion can
cause hate; and these feelings of love or hate must be counted as
moral praise or blame.
On Hume's view, then, there is no distinction between natural
and moral traits in their ability to affect our sentiments. But,
Hume asks, what other criterion is there to differentiate them ( T,
p. 607)? The answer most commonly given is that natural abilities
are "involuntary, " while moral traits are subject to human free
will. Hume believes that attention to this criterion is primarily
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"why moralists have invented" the distinction between natural
abilities and moral virtues (T, p. 609); however, he believes that
this invention is totally unjustified.
First, Hume points out that, as a matter of fact, many of
the qualities which are ordinarily considered to be virtues are as
constant and inalterable as those traits considered to be natural
abilities. As an example Hume mentions the virtue of magnanimity
such a trait cannot be nurtured or destroyed by a short-term act
of will, and must be considered more involuntary than voluntary.
Hume next appeals to his definition of virtue to show that
there is nothing m the definition which prevents an involuntary
quality from being counted as a virtue:
Moral distinctions arise from the natural distinctions of
pain and pleasure; and when we receive those feelings from
the general consideration of any quality or character, we
denominate it vicious or virtuous. Now I believe no one
will assert, that a quality can never produce pleasure or
pain to the person who considers it, unless it be perfectly
voluntary in the person who possesses it (T, p. 609).
Finally, Hume attacks the voluntary-involuntary distinction itself
by appealing to his well-known analysis of free will and necessity,
given in the Treatise 1 s section entitled "Of liberty and necessity, "
in Book II.
Still, Hume points out, there is an initially plausible argument
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for a distinction between virtues and natural abilities, even within
the structure of Hume's own theory of the moral sentiment "it
may, indeed, be pretended, that the sentiment of approbation, which
{^natural abilities] produce, besides its being inferior
,
is also
somewhat different from that, which attends the other virtues"
(T, p. 607). Even if this were so, Hume continues, it does not
merit witholding the appellation of "virtue" from the natural
abilities; according to Hume, "each of the virtues, even benevolence,
justice, gratitude, integrity, excites a different sentiment or feeling
in the spectator" (T, p. 607).
It is now clear that Hume has all along been using "love"
(and "hate") as a generic term, denoting a class of resembling
passions. The members are similar in that they are all produced
from the same double relation of impressions and ideas, and are
directed toward another person with whom we associate a certain
idea of pleasure. In addition, Hume implies, these passions are
similar in the way they feel when experienced; we have no difficulty
in recognizing each as a kind of love when we feel it;
'Tis altogether impossible to give any definition of the
passions of love and hatred
. . .
'Twoul'd be as unnecessary
to attempt any description of them
. . .
because these passions
of themselves are sufficiently known from our common
feeling and experience (T, p. 329).
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The kind of love which is produced depends on the nature of that
pleasure which is associated with the object of the passion, and on
the status of the object. For instance.
Love and esteem are at the bottom the same passions, andanse from like causes. The qualities, that produce both
are agreeable, and give pleasure. But where this pleasure
is secure and serious; or where its object is great, and
makes a strong impression; or where it produces any degree
of humility and awe; In all these cases, the passion,' which
arises from the pleasure, is more properly denominated
esteem than love (T, p. 608).
Love, of any kind, is described by Hume as a "feeling of
approbation. As we have seen, love produced under the proper
conditions is moral approbation, and arises in response to those
qualities of mind we call "virtues. " But this love which constitutes
moral praise may vary with variations in the pleasure or pain which
is the moi al sentiment, and Hume indicates that such variations
in the moral sentiment do occur.
. . . whenever we survey the actions and characters of men,
without any particular interest in them, the pleasure or
pain, which arises from the survey (with some minute
differences ) is, in the main, of the same kind"; tho '^perhaps
there be a great diversity in the causes, from which it is
deriv'd (T, p. 617; italics mine).
That such variations occur in the moral sentiment, and con-
sequently in the passion of love that follows, does not stop us from
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recognizing as virtues the various character traits we observe.
Similarly, Hume argues, when we contemplate in the appropriate
way those qualities commonly termed "natural abilities, " the pro-
pensity we experience may indeed be slightly different in sensation
than other moral sentiments; but this is no good reason to deny it
the status of a moral sentiment, as those pleasures which arise
upon contemplation of qualities commonly taken to be virtues them-
selves vary from one to the other.
Thus, the kind of love inspired by a natural ability will
differ from those kinds produced by virtues proper; but even these
latter differ among themselves. We have no good reason, then,
to withold from the love inspired by the natural virtues the status
of moral praise or approbation.
The characters of Caesar and Cato, as drawn by Sallust, are
both of them virtuous, in the strictest sense of the word; but
in a different way; Nor are the sentiments entirely the same
which arise from them. The one produces love; the other
esteem.
. .
In like manner, the approbation, which attends
natural abilities, may be somewhat different to the feeling
from that, which arises from the other virtues, without
making them entirely of a different species (T, pp. 607-608).
Because the sentiments which are excited by natural abilities are
similar to those excited by virtues, and because "virtue" itself
is defined in terms of sentiments, Hume concludes that natural
abilities must be counted as virtues. Hume makes this point
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succinctly in his essay "Of Some Verbal Disputes":
Nothing is moie usual that for philosophers to encroach
upon the province of grammarians and to engage in disputes
of words, while they imagine that they are handling con-
troversies of the deepest importance and concern
... if,
in short, the sentiments are similar which arise from
Cnatural abilities! and from the social virtues, is there
any reason for being so extremely scrupulous about a word,
or disputing whether they be entitled to the der ation
of virtues?
3
Hume believes that any object, animate or inanimate, can
become an object of affection (or approbation) if it in some way
becomes associated with pleasure. However, there are different
"species" of affections corresponding to different types of objects
Hume does not tell us what the important divisions are in types
of object, but it is clear that human beings and inanimate objects
are two such classes.
All the sentiments of approbation, which attend any particular
species of objects, have a great resemblance to each other,
tho' deriv'd from different sources; and, on the other hand,
these sentiments, when directed to different objects, are
different to the feeling, tho' deriv'd from the same source
(T, p. 617).
What Hume is saying here can best be explained by example.
Inanimate objects can give us pleasure in many ways. A painting
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can give us pleasure through its beauty; a whirlpool bath can give
us physical pleasure; a wonder drug can give us pleasure through
sympathy with those it cures. Yet, even though these pleasures
are derived differently, "from different sources, " the affections
produced toward these inanimate objects will be of the same kind
or species - they will be very similar in sensation. Likewise,
people can give us pleasure in various ways. A person can give
us pleasure through a beautiful appearance, from physical sensation,
from furthering our own interests, from his virtue. Again, though
the pleasures differ, the affections produced as a result are of the
same kind - in this case love. Thus, Hume is saying, no matter
how the pleasure is derived, our affections for inanimate objects
will always be of the same kind, and our affection for people will
be of another kind, love. Hume goes on to point out that this remains
the case even when the pleasure received from an inanimate object
is the same as that received from another person. A mechanical
sexual partner might give the same physical pleasure as a human
partner, but the affections produced will still be different in kind.
Similarly, "a convenient house, and a virtuous character, cause
not the same feeling of approbation; even tho' the source of our
approbation be the same, and flow from sympathy and an idea of
their utility" (T, p. 617).
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Hume's theory of the passions is often attacked on the grounds
that it mistakes a logical relation between passion and object for a
contingent i elation. A passion for Ilume is a simple impression
£md its object is that entity to whose idea we are led whenever we
experience the passion. The identifying characteristic of a passion
is its sensation; but because we cannot be given the idea of an im-
pression unless we first experience that impression, Hume can only
describe the passions "by an enumeration of such circumstances,
as attend them" (T, p. 277). One aspect of these circumstances is
the object of a passion - that entity to whose idea we are led when-
ever we experience the passion. As we have seen, Hume restricts
the objects a passion can have. For instance,
'Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho' directly contrary,
have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self
. . .
Here
the view always fixes when we are actuated by either of
these passions
. . .
No one can doubt but this property is
natural from the constancy and steadiness of its operations.
'Tis always self, which is the obiect of pride and humility
(T, pp. 277-280).
... so the object of love and hatred is some other person . . .
This is sufficiently evident from experience. Our love and
hatred are always directed to some sensible being external
to us
. .
.
(T, p. 329).
Hume's restrictions on the possible objects of passions are
contingent. A passion is a simple impression, and its idea is also
simple; as such, according to Hume, its idea can have no logical or
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necessary connection with any other idea. The range of possible
objects of a certain passion can only be derived in experience; we
see that, as a matter of fact, the object of pride is always self,
and the object of love is always another person. Although human
nature is so constituted, by "an original quality or primary impulse"
(T, p. 280), that the idea of self always follows that passion which
Hume calls pride, it is conceivable that the same passion be
followed by the idea of another; and even though the idea of another
person always follows that passion which Hume calls "love, " it is
conceivable that the same passion be followed by the idea of an
inanimate object.
However, Ardal argues that "contrary to Hume's view, one
must insist that it would be logically absurd to suggest that a man
might have the passion of pride, and, at the same time, that the
object of this pride (in Hume's sense of 'object') is another and not
the person himself. For Ardal, "pride" denotes more than just
a feeling; it refers to a complex phenomenon which includes certain
overt behavior patterns. Being proud may include the occasional
experiencing of prideful feelings, but it may not. "A man is not
only proud when he is, and so long as he is, experiencing the glow
of the feeling of pride, and he may in fact be proud though he sin-
cerely claims that he does not have this glow ... A man is not at
95
all the best judge himself as to whether he is a proud man. " 4
/
Ardal agrees that there is a sense in which self is the object of
price, but it is not that a feeling of pride directs our attention to
ourselves. Rather, it is that pride is defined as an expression of
self-valuing. It is therefore logically impossible to have pride with-
out this self- valuing.
I think Ardal' s account of pride is more accurate than Hume's,
insofar as it more adequately reflects what we ordinarily mean by
pride. But Hume is not concerned with language usage. His
point is that there are certain feelings which all human beings ex-
perience. Some are bodily sensations; others are what he calls
"passions" or "emotions. " These feelings can be named. Now,
experience shows that certain of these feelings tend to arise under
certain circumstances; Hume describes these circumstances for
pride, humility, love, and hate. The circumstances surrounding
pride and humility include the thought of one's self, and those
surrounding love and hate include the thought of another; but there
is no logical connection between these feelings and their attendant
circumstances.
The disagreement between Hume and Ardal may be illustrated
as follows
. Most of us know what it is to experience a toothache.
For Hume, "toothache" might name a certain kind of physical pain.
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If we did an empirical study, we would find that this sensation is
usually accompanied by the presence of a tooth which can be shown
to be decayed. However, there is no logical relation between the
pain and the decayed tooth. This same pain might very well be
induced in a toothless person by placing an electrode at the proper
point in the brain. For Hume, such a person would be experiencing
a toothache even though he had no teeth. However, on an "Ardalian"
interpretation, this pain would not be a toothache because, by
definition, a toothache would involve the presence of a tooth.
As long as Hume is considering mere feelings, he cannot be
accused of confusing logical and contingent relations; and he makes
it clear that this is just what he is doing in his discussion of the
passions;
But not to dispute about words, I observe, that by pride I
understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the
mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches orpower makes us satisfy' d with ourselves: And that by
humility I mean the opposite impression
. . . Let us, there-
fore, examine these impressions, consider'd in themselves;
and enquire into their causes
... ( T, pp. 297-298).
It may very well be, as Ardal argues, that our concepts of passions
such as pride and love include more than just the ideas of certain
feelings. Yet, it does seem that there are certain distinct feelings
which are characteristic of pride and love; and these are the feelings
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with which Hume is concerned.
Now Hume does not deny that, in fact, different passions
have associated with them, in addition to certain types of objects,
certain kinds of behavior patterns or dispositions. For instance:
Love is always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the
person lov'd, and an aversion to his misery: As hatred
produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the
happiness of the person hated (T, p. 367).
Such desires and aversions will tend to motivate certain kinds of
action. But once again, according to Hume, the passions of love
and hate are logically distinct from their usual accompaniments:
Love and hatred might have been unattended with any such
desires, or their particular connexion might have been
entirely revers'd. If nature had so pleas'd, love might have
had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as love (T, p. 368)
The most that can be said against Hume is that he is mis-
taken in believing that there is a distinct feeling or impression
which is characteristic of each of the passions. Though I tend to
side with Hume in the cases of love and hate, and perhaps pride and
humility, this criticism does seem accurate when we consider
the wide range of the Humean passions: envy, pity, ambition, gener
osity, grief, fear, despair, etc. Contrary to Hume, there does
not seem to be a different unique feeling peculiar to each of these;
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and thus we may accuse Hume of a failure i
But even in these cases it
n his introspections.
is misleading to accuse Ilume of mistaking
a logical relation for a contingent relation. Such an accusation
implies that there really are two or more entities whose relation
has been mistakenly identified, for instance, a feeling on the one
hand and, on the other, the complex consisting of the object of the
passion and a set of dispositions to behave in certain ways. Bat
the substance of the criticism is that, for at least some of what
Hume calls the "passions, " there is only the latter; and though this
may be so, Hume's error lies in believing that there is the former
also, and not in mistaking a logical relation for a contingent one.
*
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I believe it is here that Hume's conflict as to the status
of the moral sentiment originates. On the one hand, Hume wants
to maintain that the moral sentiment causes us to love or hate
(i. e.
,
piaise or blame); in this capacity the moral sentiment must
be viewed as a kind of pleasure or pain, or impression of sensation.
But, on the other hand, Hume wants to hold that the moral sentiment
has an object - namely, those mental qualities which are virtues
or vices; and in this capacity the moral sentiment must be treated
as a passion, or impression of reflection.
See, for example, Ardal, pp. 23-27.
^Ardal, p. 23.
4
Ibid.
,
p. 22.
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CHAPTER V
THE MORAL SENTIMENT IN HUME'SAN inquiry CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
1
An In^Mry Concerning the Principles of Morals was published
in 1752; it is a revision of Book III of the Treatise
,
which had been
published twelve years earlier. The Treatise itself was largely
ignored by Hume's contemporaries, prompting him to bemoan the
work as having fallen "deadborn from the press. " Hume for the
most part attributed the failure of the Treatise to a difficult style,
one which did not appeal to the general reading public. Yet, Hume's
dissatisfaction with the Treatise came to run much deeper than a
distaste for its literary quality; his avowed goal in the Treatise of
uncovering positive principles of human nature later seemed to Hume
to be the reflection of an unwarranted youthful optimism:
I am apt, in a cool hour, to suspect, in general, that most
of my Reasonings will be more useful by containing Hints
and exciting People's Curiousity than as containing any
Principles that will augment the Store of Knowledge that
must pass to future ages.
Above all, the positive Air, which prevails in that Book £the
Treatise ] , and which may be imputed to the Ardor of Youth,
so much displeases me, that I have not Patience to review it. 2
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In the years following publication of the Treat ise, Ilume
attempted to make amends by revising separately each book of the
Treatise. An Inquiry Concerning Huma n Understanding
, published
in 1748, is a revision of Book I, and A Dissertation on the Passions,
which was published in 1757, is a revision of Book II. There are two
important differences between Book I and An Inquiry Concerning
Human Understanding
. Hume's principle of the association of ideas
serves a major role in the Treatise
; "here is a kind of ATTRACTION,
which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary
effects as m the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various
forms" (T, p. 13). Hume relies on the principle to explain the
origin of many of our complex ideas, such as that of substance, and
to explain the mechanisms of belief and sympathy. This principle
of association does appear in An Inquiry Concerning Human Under-
standing
,
but its importance there is considerably diminished, in
accord with Hume's growing pessimism about finding such basic
principles of human nature. Hume's strongest statement about the
role of the principle now becomes:
These loose hints I have thrown together in order to excite
the curiousity of philosophers, and beget a suspicion at
least if not a full persuasion that this subject is very copious,
and that many operations of the human mind depend on the
connection or association of ideas which is here explained
(IU, p. 39).
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In later editions of the Inquiry
,
even this statement is omitted,
along with several pages containing illustrations of the workings
of the principle. In these later editions Hume's discussion of the
principle is reduced to no more than three paragraphs.
The second change concerns the nature of the self. Book I
of the
-Treatise contains an entire section, entitled "Of personal
identity, in which Hume argues that we have no impression, and
hence no idea, of that simple and unchanging existence which is
supposed to constitute the self. We have only a series of impressions
or perceptions, the ideas of which become associated in the mind
through the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation;
it follows, that our notions of personal identity, proceed entirely
from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along
a train of connected ideas, according to the principles above
explain'd ' (T, p. 260). We have seen how this conflicts with his
account of sympathy in the Treatise
,
which relies on "the idea, or
rather impression of ourselves which is always intimately present
with us" (T, p. 317). In addition, Hume comes to see that in arguing
that the mind never perceives any unity in its distinct perceptions
he is assuming the very thing he wishes to deny; that there is a
continuing mental existence. In the Appendix of the Treatise Hume
admits temporary defeat in this matter;
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In short there are two principles, which I cannot render
consistent; nor is it m my power to renounce either of them,
viz. that all our distinct p erceptions are distinct existences,
and that jthe mind never perceives any real connexion among"
distmct
_existences ... For my part, I must pleadlhe ^Tlege
of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard formy understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it
absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon
more mature reflexions, may discover some hypothesis,
that will reconcile those contradictions (T, p. 636) .
Yet it is apparent that whatever "more mature reflexions" Hume
came upon in the interval between the Treatise and An Inquiry Con-
cerning Human Understanding they did not provide him with a solution
to this problem of the self because it is nowhere mentioned in the
Inquiry.
A Dissertation on the Passions is a revision of Book II of the
Treatise
;
it is, according to Kemp Smith, "by general consent
the least satisfying of all his writings. "° It is little more than a
review of the "double relation" explanation of the origin of the passions
found in the T reatis e. In the Treatise this explanation relies
heavily on the principle of association and on an ever present im-
pression of the self; but on these two doctrines Hume has lost con-
fidence since the writing of the Treatise
,
and his attempt to revise
Book II with that in mind "is so shortened as to leave the argument
barely intelligible.
The main concern of this present chapter, though, is the
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relation between Book III and its revision. An Inquiry Concerning the
P^n^iples of Morals
. Kemp Smith believes that Book III is "the
one Book of the Treatise which Hume contrived to rescue almost
intact. " 5 In spite of Hume's own claim, in his short autobiographical
sketch entitled "My Own Life, " that the Inquiry Concerning the Prin-
ciples of Morals "is of all my writings, historical, philosophical,
or literary, incomparably the best, " I find it to be very unclear in
its most important points, those regarding the relationship between
sympathy and the moral sentiment. In the following I shall attempt
to dispel some of this unclarity.
2
Initially Hume's argument in the Inquiry follows that of the
Treatise
. In order to discover "the true origin of morals, " Hume
first sets out to determine what it is that various types of virtues
have in common. As in the Treatise, he finds that those characters
considered to be social virtues all share the quality of being useful
to society at large. A virtuous character is one which pleases us
when contemplated in a certain manner; as before, then, Hume seeks
to find those principles by which the usefulness of characters can
please. Again, Hume argues that usefulness can please only if the
end which it promotes pleases, and this end is the welfare of others.
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How, then, can the happiness and pleasures of others please us?
And if we would employ a little thought on the present subject
we need be at no loss to account for the influence of utility
and to deduce it from principles the most known and avowed
in human nature (I, p. 42).
The following crucial passage comes a few pages later;
Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a
contradiction in terms that anything pleases as means to an
end where the end itself nowise affects us. If usefulness,
therefore, be a source of moral sentiment, and if this use-
fulness be not always considered with a reference to self,
it follows that everything which contributes to the happiness
of society recommends itself directly to our approbation
and good will. Here is a principle which accounts, in great
part, for the origin of morality; and what need we seek for
absti use and remote systems when there occurs one so
obvious and natural? (I, p. 47).
Understanding "approbation" as we did in the Treatise to mean "love"
or "affection, " and remembering that these passions can be caused in
us only consequent to the production of a separate pleasure, we are
again led to ask how it is that the pleasure of others can cause a
pleasure in us. Hume offers the following cryptic answer in a foot-
note to the above passage;
It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we
have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others? It is sufficient
that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature.
We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and
there are, in every science, some general principles beyond
which we cannot hope to find any principle more general. No
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man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery
of others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure,
the second pain. This everyone may find in himself. It is
not probable that these principles can be resolved into
principles more simple and universal, whatever attempts
may have been made to that purpose. But if it were possible,
it belongs not to the present subject; and we may here safely'
consider these principles as original - happy if we can render
all the consequences sufficiently plain and perspicuous t
(I; p. 47).
This short footnote is the key to understanding the alteration
Hume's theory has undergone since the writing of the Treatise;
nevertheless, it is a passage easily misinterpreted. On one reading,
it might seem that humanity and 'fellow-feeling" refer to the same
principle in human nature, and from the description that follows, this
principle might be taken to be that of sympathy. This hypothesis
seems to be strengthened in the following several pages, where Hume
gives numerous examples of a "sympathetic movement of pleasure
and uneasiness. "
In general, it is certain that wherever we go, whatever we
reflect on or converse about, everything still presents us
with the view of human happiness or misery and excites
in our heart a sympathetic movement of pleasure or un-
easiness. In our serious occupations, in our careless
amusements, this principle still exerts its active energy
(I, pp. 48-49).
Kemp Smith adheres to this present interpretation which identifies
humanity with sympathy: "The Enquiry concerning the Principles of
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Mor_als is a restatement of [Book III of the Treatise
] , almost
the only fundamental change being in respect of sympathy, which is
now treated as an ultimate propensity of the Mind, and which he
now also entitles sometimes 'benevolence' and sometimes
'humanity. ' " 6 Thus, Smith interprets the footnote to be saying
that Hume is abandoning the attempt to resolve the principle of
sympathy into principles "more simple and universal, " as was done
in the Treatise
. In this Smith is correct; but in misreading the
passage he has gotten only half of Hume's meaning.
In the footnote Hume is discussing two different principles
of human nature. One indeed is that of sympathy, or "fellow-
feeling, " which, as in the Treatise
,
is the human ability to com-
municate sentiments. In the pages immediately following the foot-
note Hume offers several detailed examples of sympathy in operation;
We enter, I shall suppose, into a convenient, warm, well-
contrived apartment
.. . The hospitable, good-humored,
humane landlord appears
. . .
His whole family, by the freedom,
ease, confidence, and calm enjoyment diffused over their
countenances, sufficiently express their happiness. I
have a pleasing sympathy in the prospect of so much joy,
and can never consider the source of it without the most
agreeable emotions (I, p. 48).
Every movement of the theater, by a skillful poet, is com-
municated, as it were, by magic to the spectators, who
weep, tremble, resent, rejoice, and are inflamed with all
the variety of passions which actuate the several personages
of the drama (I, p. 49).
But mixed in with these illustrations of sympathy are cases which
clearly are examples of something else:
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C he landlord! tells me that an oppressive and powerful
neighbor had attempted to dispossess him of his inheritance
and had long disturbed his innocent and social pleasures.
I feel an immediate indignation arise in me against such
violence and injury (I, p. 48; italics mine).
But it is no wonder, he adds, that a private wrong shouldproceed from a man who had enslaved provinces, depopulated
cities, and made the field and scaffold stream with human
blood. I am struck with horror at the prospect of so much
misery and am actuated by the strongest antipathy against
the author (I, p. 48; italics mine).
Where any event crosses our wishes and interrupts the
happiness of the favorite characters, we feel a sensible
anxiety and concern. But where their sufferings proceed
from the treachery, cruelty, or tyranny of an enemy, our
breasts are affected with the liveliest resentment against the
author of these calamities (I, p. 49; italics mine).
These sentiments of resentment or indignation that we feel toward
an evil-doer and his actions are not derived from sympathy with his
victim; the victim may himself experience no such sentiments toward
his tormentor, or he may even be dead, and presumably experiencing
no sentiments at all with which we might sympathize. What, then,
according to Hume, are these sentiments?
In reading the first appendix to the Inquiry, entitled "Con-
l
cerning Moral Sentiment, " we find that these sentiments of resent-
ment fit the description of moral sentiments:
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It is requisite a sentiment should here display itself in order
dencies
3 ence to thc useful above the pernicious ten-. This sentiment can be no other than a feeling forthe happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery
since these are the different ends which virtue and vice havea tendency to promote. Here, therefore, reason instructs
“S
,
m
.
VCral tendencie s of actions, and humanity makes
a distinction in favor of those which are useful and bene-
ficial (I, p. 105).
Humanity is not sympathy, then. Although it is our sympathy with
others that allows us to share in their feelings, it is our humanity
that produces the propensity or aversion we feel toward the human
causes of their feelings, and this propensity or aversion is none
other than the moral sentiment:
The same sentiments of the mind, in every circumstance,
are agreeable to the sentiment of morals and to that of
humanity
... By all the rules of philosophy, therefore, we
must conclude that these sentiments are originally the same,
since in each particular, even the most minute, they are
governed by the same laws and are moved by the same objects
di p. 6i).
Returning to the footnote, we see now that humanity and
fellow-feeling are different; some of the examples which follow
it illustrate one, some the other. "What sympathy then touches
every human heart! What indignation against the tyrant whose cause-
less fear or unprovoked malice give rise to such detestable bar-
barity! (I, pp. 50-51); here again Hume alludes to the duality
of the sentiments involved when we contemplate certain behaviors.
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What is Hume's position in the Inquiry with respect to the
connection between moral sentiments and sympathetic sentiments?
On this point Hume is extremely vague. He does seem to indicate
in several places that the operation of sympathy is necessary for
the operation of humanity:
If any man, from a cold insensibility of narrow selfishness
of temper, is unaffected with the images of human happiness
or misery, he must be equally indifferent to the images of
vice and virtue (I, p. 52).
. . . these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so
deeply into all our sentiments and have so powerful an in-
fluence as may enable them to excite the strongest censure
and applause (I, p. 57).
We are also told that the moral sentiment is a kind of pleasure or,
presumably, pain: ".
. .
we resolve the pleasure which arises from
views of utility into the sentiments of humanity and sympathy"
(I, p. 97).
I have argued that, in the Tre atise, a moral sentiment is
nothing more than an instinctive aversion or propensity to pain or
pleasure, where this pain or pleasure is derived under certain
special conditions. On this interpretation, Hume is not postulating
a moral sense theory in the Treatise. This seems no longer to be the
case in the Inquiry.
Ill
It is not probable that these principles [humanity and sym-
pathy.! can be resolved into principles more simple and uni-
versal, whatever attempts may have been made to that pur-pose ... we may here safely consider these principles as
original (I, p. 47, footnote).
Kemp Smith has interpreted the footnote from which this quote
derives as saying nothing more than that Hume is abandoning the
attempt to explain the mechanism of sympathy by appealing to
principles more basic, such as the association of ideas. However,
if I am correct, Hume is also doing something much more important -
he is no longer resolving the moral sentiment, or the sentiment of
humanity
,
into a sentiment more basic, such as the natural emotional
reaction to pleasure or pain. He has, in fact, come to embrace a
legitimate moral sense theory, with the role of the moral sense
being played by humanity.
The picture we are given in the Inquiry is of a partnership
between sympathy and humanity, each conditioning and reinforcing
the other. Our sense of humanity is "original, " as fundamental
as the physical senses. It is so constituted as to give us a peculiar
kind of displeasure (or pleasure) upon the view or contemplation
of the human causes of misery (or happiness); this displeasure Hume
variously describes as "indignation, " "resentment, " and "prejudice. "
It is our sympathy that makes us more sensitive to the presence of
misery or happiness in others, and thus increases the range and
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power of our sense of humanity. On the other hand, our sentiment
of indignation toward an evil-doer augments our sympathy with his
victims, and allows us to share even more intensely their feelings
of misery and pain. As I showed earlier, Kemp Smith offers a
similar interpretation of Book III of the Treatise, and thus he is led
to conclude that there is no major change in Hume's position in the
Inquiry. I am arguing that there is a profound change, from the view
of the Treatise that our so-called "moral sense" can be resolved
into our (properly conditioned) natural aversion to pain and pro-
pensity for pleasure, to the view of the Inquiry that there is in human
beings a true moral sense, humanity, which provides us with the
unique kind of pleasures and pains which are the moral sentiments.
My argument finds additional support in comparing the
^
Tre atise to the Inquiry with respect to treatment of the moral point
of view. In the Treatise Hume insists that we cannot experience a
moral sentiment unless we have adopted the moral point of view. As
I argued earlier, if we interpret Hume as there advocating a moral
sense theory, we are left with no explanation, nor can we expect
any, of why it is that this moral sense cannot operate unless the moral
point of view has been completely and successfully adopted. If we
interpret Hume in the way I suggest, however, it becomes true by
definition that we cannot experience a moral sentiment unless we first
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take the moral point of view. Now I am maintaining that Hume
iLProposing a moral sense theory in Inquiry
; does he therefore
now encounter a difficulty with the necessity of the moral point
of view?
A careful examination of the Inquiry reveals that he does not,
for he no longer insists that the moral point of view is a necessary
prerequisite for moral sentiments. More than this, Hume never
specifically mentions the moral point of view at all. His view now
is that humanity continues to operate, and to produce the moral
sentiments, even though selfish considerations are not eliminated.
These moral sentiments may be over- shadowed by the selfish
sentiments, but they exist nevertheless, and can be recognized if
we are careful;
Let us suppose a person ever so selfish, let private interest
have engrossed ever so much his attention, yet in instances
where that is not concerned he must unavoidably feel some
propensity of the good of mankind and make it an objecFoF
choice, if everything else be equal
. . .
And if the principles
of humanity are capable, in many instances, of influencing
our actions, they must, at all times, have some authority
over our sentiments and give us a general approbation of
what is useful to society, and blame of what is dangerous
or pernicious. The degrees of these sentiments may be the
subject of controversy, but the reality of their existence,
one should think, must be admitted in every theory or
system (I, pp. 52-53).
And if these sentiments, in most men, be not so strong as
those which have a reference to private good, yet still they
must make some distinction, even in persons the most de-
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praved and selfish, and must attach the notion of good to a
beneficent conduct, and of evil to the contrary ( I, p . 55).
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CHAPTER VI
1HE MORAL SENTIMENT AND MORAL EVALUATION
1
My concern so far has been with the interpretation of the
origin and nature of the moral sentiment in Hume. The task now is
to determine the role of this moral sentiment in moral evaluation.
Hume never clearly tells us what he takes a moral evaluation to be;
one must go about the task of discovering his view by digging
patiently, by weighing different possible interpretations, by being
aware of what is not said as well as what is, and by paying strict
attention to Hume's clearest statements about moral evaluations.
The most common interpretations of Hume on this issue can
be divided into two general classes. In this chapter I will examine
these interpretations in detail. I will try to show that each of these
different interpretations has its own unique strength, in that it seems
accurately to explain some important points Hume makes about moral
evaluations; however, I will argue that both interpretations must
ultimately be rejected, as they conflict with other crucial statements
Hume makes with regard to the characteristics of moral evaluation.
I will then offer a third interpretation of Hume on moral evaluation,
one which seems to unite the strengths of the former interpretations,
while avoiding their most serious drawbacks.
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2
On the first type of interpretation, which Ardal terms the
Emotionist interpretation, the very experience of a moral senti-
ment constitutes a moral evaluation. For instance, if I witness an
act of killing and I come to experience a moral sentiment as a result,
I have, according to the Emotionist interpretation, thereby morally
evaluated, or judged, the act and its perpetrator; the act of evaluating
consists in the having of the emotion, while the content of the evalua-
tion is the emotion itself.
Such an interpretation of Hume can be found in numerous
places. For instance, William K. Frankena says this;
LHume.] goes on to suggest that precisely because we need
or want a language in which to express, not just statements
peculiar to ourselves but sentiments in which we expect all
men are to concur with us, another language in which we
may claim that our sentiments are justified and valid, we
had to ' ... invent a peculiar set of terms, in order to
express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation
. . .
' This kind of an account of our normative discourse
appears to me to be eminently wise. It is a language in
which we may express our sentiments - approvals, disap-
provals, evaluations, recommendations, advice, prescriptions -
and put them out into the public arena for rational scrutiny
and discussion. ^
Although in this passage Frankena is primarily concerned with the
function of ethical language, he makes it quite clear that he under-
stands an act of moral evaluation for Hume to consist in the ex-
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periencing of a certain sentiment.
We find the. following in John W. Lenz's introduction to a
collection of essays by Hume;
A second tenet of both the Treatise and the essays, that
moral and aesthetic evaluations are expressions of sentiment
attacks the rationalist contention that one can by means of
intellectual intuition know what is good or bad
. .
. Hume's
view is that in finding something to be good or bad, beautiful
or ugly, a person is reacting emotively to it; that in saying
something is good or bad, beautiful or ugly, a person is
expressing his feelings of approval or disapproval
Because Hume is sometimes careless in his way of putting
it, his position can easily be misunderstood. His view is
not_ that in finding an object worthwhile, a person is describ-
ing or stating how he feels toward it ... ^
Finally, Ardal also sees Hume as an Emotionist with respect
to moral evaluation;
The Emotionist contends that evaluations are emotions
On [this] interpretation, the evaluation, iTseems, could not
be thought of as true or false, since feelings are not assessed
in these terms
... I have stressed more than once that Hume
most decidedly did not think his main concern was with moral
language
. It is Emotionism and not Emotivism that I have
all along been attributing to him
. . . Approbation and blame
are called by Hume 'nothing but a fainter and more im-
perceptible love or hatred' ... In attributing Emotionism
to Hume, we must bear in mind that he did not consider
feeling and thinking to be different in kind; but this does not
throw doubt upon the view that, to him, evaluations are
emotions. ^
There are numerous passages, in both the Treatise and An
Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which Hume can be
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taken to support the Emotionist interpretation.
Thus the course of the argument leads us to conclude, that
since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason,
or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some
impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to
mark the difference betwixt them
. . . Morality, therefore, is
more properly felt than judg'd of
. .
.
(T, p. 470).
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satis-
faction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a
character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or ad-
miration. (T, p. 471)
'Tis only when a character is considered in general, without
reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a
feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or
evil (T, p. 472).
In moral deliberations
. . .
all the circumstances of the case
are to be laid before us ere we can fix any sentence of blame
or approbation
. . .
The approbation which then ensues cannot
be the work of the judgment but of the heart; and it is not
a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling
or sentiment (I, p. 108).
The Emotionist interpretation accords well with Hume's
concern to show the practicality of morality: "morals excite passions,
and produce or prevent actions" (T, p. 457). According to Hume, all
deliberate actions (and these are the only kind which fall within
the province of morality, indicating, as they do, durable principles
of the character) proceed from an act of the will; "by the will, I
mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious
of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or
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new perception of our mind" (T, p. 399). In order, then, to dis-
cover what will "produce or prevent” deliberate actions, we must
consider what Hume says about the causes of movements of the will.
Part III of Book II of the Treatise is titled "of the will and
direct passions"; here (T, p. 439) Hume tells us that the will, which
he identifies with volition, is moved only by the direct passions of
desire or aversion, which arise spontaneously from pleasure or
pam, either actual (in impression) or imagined (in idea). 4 It is
for this reason that Hume later states that "the chief spring or
actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain; and when
these sensations are remov'd, both from our thought and feeling, we
are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of desire
or volition" (T, p. 574).
Thus, because, according to Hume, moral evaluations in
themselves are capable of influencing our deliberate actions, and
because it is only the direct passions that can directly influence the
will, an interpretation of Hume on moral evaluations must reveal an
intimate connection between moral evaluations and the direct passions
one so necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it must take
place and have its influence; tho' the difference betwixt these minds
be in other respects immense and infinite" (T, p. 465). It is in this
respect that the Emotionist interpretation is most attractive, for here
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the act of moral evaluation is nothing more than the experiencing
of a moral sentiment, which, as we have seen earlier, is itself a
direct passion of propensity or aversion arising from sympathetic
pleasures or pains, and thus capable of influencing the will.
3
In spite of the appeal of the Emotionist interpretation, there
are several important passages which make it clear to me that this
interpretation does not represent Hume's final position. Let us
suppose that I am morally evaluating a certain character A and
another character B; if I judge that A and B are equally vicious or
virtuous, on the Emotionist interpretation this can only mean that
I judge that the moral sentiment I experience as a result of con-
templating A is of equal intensity with that of the moral sentiment
I experience as a result of contemplating B. But Hume offers several
examples which show that often such comparisons of moral worth
are not made in this way, and thus that the Emotionist account is
inadequate:
The approbation of moral qualities
. .
.
proceeds entirely from
a moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or
disgust, which arise upon the contemplation and view of
particular qualities or characters. Now 1 tis evident, that
these sentiments, whenceever they are deriv'd, must vary
according to the distance of contiguity of the objects; nor
can I feel the same lively pleasure from the virtues of a
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person, who liv'd in Greece two thousand years ago, that I
feel from the virtues of a familiar friend and acquaintance.
Yet I do not say, that I esteem the one more than the other
(T, pp. 581-582).
Our servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite stronger
sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus, as rep-
resented in history; but we say not upon that account, that
the former character is more- laudable than the latter. We
know, that were we to approach equally near to that renown 1 d
patriot, he wou'd command a much higher degree of affection
and admiration (T, p. 582).
We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history,
with one perform'd in our neighbourhood t'other day; The
meaning of which is, that we know from reflexion, that the
former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of dis-
approbation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position
(T, p. 584).
When ... a good disposition is attended with good fortune,
which renders it really beneficial to society, it gives a
stronger pleasure to the spectator, and is attended with a
more lively sympathy. We are more affected by it; and yet
we do not say that it is more virtuous, or that we esteem
it more
. . .
The case is the same, as when we correct the
different sentiments of virtue, which proceed from its dif-
ferent distances from ourselves. The passions do not
always follow our corrections; but these corrections serve
sufficiently to regulate our abstract notions, and are alone
regarded, when we pronounce in general concerning the
degrees of vice and virtue (T, p. 585).
The moral sentiment, as I have interpreted it, is a propensity
or aversion resulting from sympathetic pleasures or pains, con-
sequent to taking the moral point of view. Yet, even after adopting
the moral point of view, the strength of our sympathy will vary
according to distance, time, resemblance, etc. The strength of the
propensity or aversion will thus also vary with these factors. The
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above examples show that we may judge A to be equally virtuous
or vicious with B, even though the strength of the moral sentiments
actually experienced as a result of contemplating A and B differ
widely, it is hard to see how the Emotionist interpretation, under
which an actually experienced moral sentiment is an evaluation,
could account for this.
Moreover, Hume suggests that we can make moral judgments
even though we are unable to adopt the moral point of view, and thus
unable to experience a moral sentiment.
But however the general principle of our blame or praise may
be corrected by those other principles,
' tis certain, they are
not altogether efficacious, nor do our passions often cor-
respond entirely to the present theory. 'Tis seldom men
heartily love what lies at a distance from them, and what no
way redounds to their particular benefit; as 'tis no less rare
to meet with persons, who can pardon another any opposition
he makes to their interest, however justifiable that opposition
may be by the general rules of morality. Here we are
contented with saying, that reason requires such an impartial
conduct, but that 'tis seldom we can bring ourselves to it,
and that our passions do not readily follow the determination
of our judgment ( T, p. 583).
Once again the Emotionist interpretation proves inadequate, for it
implies that there is no moral evaluation if there is no actual ex-
perience of a moral sentiment. We must look for an alternative
interpretation. The most common one will be considered next.
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Hume makes frequent reference to the correction of the senti-
ments which arise when we consider certain characters or actions.
Sometimes we tend to let our personal interests and desires influence
the way we look at a certain situation. In such cases we can try to
correct the interested sentiments which result by reconsidering the
situation from the moral point of view:
lis therefore from the influence of characters and qualities
upon those who have an intercourse with any person, that we
*
bmme or praise him. We consider not whether the persons
a ected by the qualities, be our acquaintance or strangers
countrymen or foreigners. Nay, we overlook our own interest
in the general judgments; and blame not a man for opposing
us
. . . when his own interest is particularly concerned
B_y this reflexion we correct those sentiments o f blame, which
so naturally arise upon any opposition (T, pp. 582-583;
italics mine).
Of course, Hume is not saying that such a correction is desirable
in all such cases, for we all are entitled to like or dislike people
and their actions for personal reasons; it is only when we wish to
make a moral evaluation that we would attempt such a correction.
However, as we have seen, even if we are successful in
adopting the moral point of view, our sympathetic sentiments, and
the resulting moral sentiments, will vary according to our proximity
in distance or time to the situation we are evaluating. For instance,
125
suppose I actually witness a father murder his infant child; it is
to be expected that the sentiments aroused in me will be extremely
intense, as the horror of the act is played out before my eyes.
Contrast this with my merely reading about such an incident that
took place hundreds of years ago; it is natural to expect that the
sentiments aroused will be somewhat tempered. Furf r, the
vividness of the account itself can be expected to influence the inten-
sity of my emotions. Nevertheless, in all these cases it is precisely
the same kind of act we are considering - and certainly we do not
imagine that the moral worth of a character or action is in any way
dependent on its geographic or temporal relation to the one judging
it. So, says Hume, we soon learn to correct for such variations in
our moral sentiments when we make moral evaluations.
Besides, every particular man has a peculiar position with
regard to others; and 1 tis impossible we cou'd ever converse
together on any reasonable terms, were each of us to con-
sider characters and persons, only as they appear from his
peculiar point ot view. In order, therefore, to prevent those
continual contradictions
,
and arrive at a more stable judgment
of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view;
and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever
may be our present situation
... and by that reflection we
correct... momentary appearance (T, pp. 581-582).
This is to be contrasted with another sort of variation in our
moral sentiments. If I witness first an act of murder and, shortly
afterward, an act of theft, we would expect the moral sentiment
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aroused in the first instance to be more intense than that aroused
in the latter instance. Here, however, this variation is not due to
a variation in my proximity to the situations; rather, this difference
in the moral sentiments is taken to reflect a real difference in the
degree of moral turpitude of the actions.
The second interpretation of Hume on moral evaluation, the
Heflectivist account, seems able to explain how we can make a moral
evaluation without feeling a moral sentiment, and also gives some
sense to Hume's references to the correction of moral sentiments.
On this interpretation of Hume, the making of a moral evaluation
consists in the passing of a judgment about how one would feel in
terms of the moral sentiment if one were to contemplate a certain
character or action from the moral point of view; the content of such
a judgment would be the proposition assented to. Such a judgment,
and hence a moral evaluation, could be made though one had not
adopted the moral point of view and hence were not experiencing a
moral sentiment. Further, the Reflectivist position can be refined
to correct for variations in temporal or geographical distance.
Thus, the act of morally evaluating would consist in the making of
a judgment about the degree of moral sentiment that would be
produced if, both, one were to contemplate the character or action
from the moral point of view and one were directly acquainted with
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the character or action. In this way we can talk of "correcting"
our actual sentiments, though, as Hume points out, "our passions
do not readily follow the determination of our judgment" (T, p. 583)-
thus, for instance, though I may judge that my moral aversion to x
would be much stronger if I were more directly acquainted with x,
the moral sentiment that I actually feel toward x will likely remain
the same.
Thei e are a number of passages in which Hume does seem to
be describing such a view of moral evaluation;
Our servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite stronger
sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus, as
represented in history; but we say not upon that account,
that the former character is more laudable than the latter.
We know, that were we to approach equally near to that
renown' d patriot, he wou'd command a much higher degree
of affection and admiration (T, p. 582).
We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history,
with one perform'd in our neighborhood t'other day; The
meaning of which is, that we know from reflexion, that the
former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of disap-
probation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position
(T, p. 584).
All objects seem to diminish by their distance; But tho'
the appearance of objects to our sense be the original standard,
by which we judge of them, yet we do not say, that they actually
diminish by the distance; but correcting the appearance by
reflexion, arrive at a more constant and establish'd judgment
coricerning them. In like manner, tho' sympathy be much
fainter than our concern for ourselves, and a sympathy with
persons remote from us much fainter than that with persons
near and contiguous; yet we neglect all these differences in
our calm judgments concerning the characters of men
. . .
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And tho' the heart does not always take part with those
general notions, or regulate its love and hatred by them, yet
are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all our purposes
in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools
(T, p. 603).
The following passage from An Inquiry Concerning the Prin-
ciples of Morals also suggests the Reflectivist interpretation;
There is no necessity that a generous action, barely mentioned
in an old history or remote gazette, should communicate
any strong feelings of applause and admiration. Virtue,
placed at such a distance, is like a fixed star which, though
to the eye of reason it may appear as luminous as the sun in
his meridian, is so infinitely removed as to affect the senses
neither with light nor heat (I, p. 57).
Often, even those commentators who offer a Reflectivist
interpretation of Hume do not do full justice to the potential of such
an account. For instance, Geoffrey Hunter attributes to Hume the
view that "a moral judgment states that there is a causal relation
between the contemplation by the speaker of some actual or imagined
state of affairs and a certain sort of feeling or sentiment that he
ghas when he does the contemplating. 11 However, Hunter's formu-
lation fails to emphasize that the "contemplation by the speaker"
must be of a very special sort - namely, contemplation from the
moral point of view. According to Hume, one cannot experience
a moral sentiment unless one has adopted the moral point of view.
Secondly, Hunter's formulation does not take into account variations
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in the moral sentiment caused by variations in distance and time,
and hence makes no contribution to understanding what Hume means
by the "correction” of moral sentiments. Yet, as I have pointed out,
the capability to make such a contribution can be built into a Re-
flectivist account.
One of the most carefully formulated Reflectivist interpre-
tations of Hume is found in Kydd's Reason and Conduct in Hume's
Treatise
. Kydd understands Hume to be saying that for one to judge
that x is good is for one to judge that "x is the kind of thing which,
considered without regard to the special relation in which it stands
to my personal interests, arouses feelings of pleasure in me or any
other disinterested spectator of like susceptibilities. " 7 In this
formulation there is present the required reference to the moral
point of view; moreover, though it is not obvious from the formu-
lation itself, Kydd elsewhere makes it clear that "the special re-
lation in which it stands to my personal interests" includes "my
particular standpoint in space and time. " 8
It should be noted in passing that Kydd’s reference to "disin-
terested spectators of like susceptibilities" is circular in her account,
because she offers no independent criterion for determining "like
susceptibility. " Thus, someone who experienced pleasure when con-
templating, from the moral point of view, an act of murder would.
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on Kydd's account, not be a person of like susceptibility. However,
on my interpretation of the moral sentiment, "like susceptibility"
could be defined without circularity: it would be the ability to
sympathize with others, along with possession of an instinctive
)
propensity for pleasure and aversion to pain.
5
Although there may be differences in formulations of Re-
flectivist interpretations of Hume, they all have one characteristic
in common; they hold that to morally evaluate x is to judge, or
come to believe, that a certain kind of contemplation of x would
cause one to experience certain feelings; that is, to judge or come to
believe that x is vicious (virtuous) is to judge or come to believe
that contemplation of x from the moral point of view would cause one
to experience the unpleasant (pleasant) moral sentiment. However,
in the present section I wish to show that such a judgment is of a
kind which Hume quite clearly denies to constitute a moral evaluation,
and thus that the Reflectivist interpretation too must be rejected.
Book I of the Treatise
,
"Of the Understanding, " is devoted
to describing the intellectual faculties of man. Hume argues that
man has the ability to reason in two different ways: demonstratively
and probabilistically. Demonstrative reasoning is concerned with
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the comparison of ideas only, and consists in the intuition of one or
more of the following relations between ideas; resemblance, pro-
portions in quantity and number, degrees of any quality, and con-
trariety (T, p. 79). For instance, if I "consider and compare"
the idea of twice two with the idea of four, I immediately perceive,
through an "act of the understanding, " that the ideas are related by
an equality in number. Hume sometimes speaks of demonstrative
reasoning as the "discovery" of relations between ideas (T, p. 464 n. ).
Apparently, Hume considers the discovery of such a relation
between ideas to be equivalent to the assent to or formation of a
belief in a certain proposition, namely, that proposition which asserts
that the ideas are related by that relation. Thus, when I compare the
ideas of twice two and the idea of four and I discover the relation
of equality in number to hold between them, I thereby have come to
believe the proposition that twice two is equal to four. Moreover,
according to Hume, if I really do have the idea of twice two and the
idea of four before my mind, it is impossible for me to conceive,
or imagine, them to be related by a non-equality in number. Hume
would express this by saying that it is impossible to conceive of the
proposition that twice two is not equal to four. Such is the case with
all propositions which express a relation between ideas; they are
immediately assented to upon conceiving them, and their opposites
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are "unintelligible" (T, p. 95).
Demonstrative reasoning, being concerned with the nature of
our ideas only, is as close to certainty as man can ever achieve;
it provides the basis for the "exact" sciences of algebra and arith-
metic, "the only sciences, in which we can carry on a chain of
reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect
exactness and certainty" (T, p. 71).
Probable reasoning, on the other hand, terminates in the
belief in the existence (past, present, or future) of external objects
or their qualities which are not "immediately present to the senses"
(T, p. 73). 9 Such reasoning is also called "reasoning by cause and
effect" or "matter of fact" reasoning. The first phase in all such
reasoning is the experience of an impression of an external object,
either from the senses or from memory (T, pp. 84-86). 10 For
instance, I receive the visual impression of a man kicking a ball.
What follows immediately, according to Hume, is the lively idea
of the ball in flight; this lively idea constitutes a belief or expectation
in the imminent flight of the ball. This complex phenomenon, the
transition from an impression of one object to a belief in another
object (or a belief in another state or quality of the same object),
constitutes for Hume an instance of probable reasoning.
Hume's analysis of cause and effect reasoning is perhaps his
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most well
-inown philosophical effort. What Hume shows is that
such reasoning, though necessary and unavoidable in daily life, can
never be justified in any given instance; and for Hume, to justify
the use of probable reason would be to show that the conclusion
reached ( i. e.
,
the proposition believed) as a result of such reason
is likely to be true. His first step in his proof is to show that
cause and effect reasoning is not demonstrative reasoning, in that
it does not depend on the nature of our ideas alone. From the idea
(or impression) alone of a man kicking a ball, no idea can be shown
to follow demonstratively; that is, starting with the idea of a man
kicking a ball as a cause, we can conceive of anything as the effect,
for instance that the man disappears and the ball becomes a pump-
kin. Our idea of a cause and our idea of the effect are always,
according to Hume, logically (demonstratively) unrelated;
May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling
from the clouds and which in all other respects resembles
snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there
any more intelligible proposition than to affirm that all the
trees will flourish in December and January, and will decay
in May and June? Now, whatever is intelligible and can be
distinctly conceived implies no contradiction and can never
be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract
reasoning a priori (IU, p. 49).
Since cause and effect reasoning cannot be justified by an appeal to
the nature of our ideas alone, as can demonstrative reasoning, if
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it is to be justified it must be done by an appeal to the nature of
our experience. In our experience we see many instances of a
certain type of cause followed by a certain type of effect. Thus, we
might imagine, when I now receive the impression of a similar cause
my belief or expectation in the existence of a similar effect is
justified ( 1 . e. , likely to be true) because experience shows that it is
highly probable that such an effect will follow such a cause. Now
Hume does admit that cause and effect reasoning requires prior ex-
perience of similar sets of causes and effects:
'Tis therefore by EXPERIENCE only, that we can infer the
existence of one object from that of another. The nature of
experience is this. We remember to have had frequent
instances of the existence of one species of objects; and also
remember, that the individuals of another species of objects
ha^e always attended them, and have existed in a regular
order of contiguity and succession with regard to them
. . .
Without any farther ceremony, we call the one cause and the
other effect
,
and infer the existence of the one from that of
the other. In all those instances, from which we learn the
conjunction of particular causes and effects, both the causes
and effects have been perceiv'd by the senses, and are re-
member'd; But in all cases, wherein we reason concerning
them, there is only one perceiv'd or remember'd, and the
other is supply' d in conformity to our past experience
(T, p. 87).
But Hume denies that cause and effect reasoning is justified by ex-
perience. His argument is most elegantly and succinctly phrased in
An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
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For 3.11 inferences f i om experience suppose, as their founda-
tion, that the future will resemble the past and that similar
powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If
there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change,
and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience
become s useless and can give rise to no inference or conclu-
sion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from
experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the
future, since all these arguments are founded on the sup-
position of that resemblance (IU, p. 51).
To paraphrase Russell's synopsis of the argument, experience can
tell us about the nature of past futures, for instance that they have
resembled past pasts. But experience can tell us nothing about the
nature of future futures unless we assume what we are t^ing to show
by an appeal to experience; namely, that the future will resemble
the past. *
Hume thus concludes that, because the beliefs generated in
matter of fact reasoning cannot be justified by an appeal to ideas or
to experience, they cannot be justified at all. But it is not Hume's
intention to show that we reach such beliefs on the basis of fallacious
arguments, because Hume's stroke of genius is his contention that we
do not reach such beliefs by any argument at all. Rather, Hume
argues that when we experience a similar set of cause and effect many
times, we involuntarily form a mental habit; when we now experience
the impression of a similar cause, our imagination in stinctively and
immediately forms the lively idea of the effect, and this lively idea
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constitutes a belief or expectation;
Now as we call everything CUSTOM, which proceeds from a
past i epetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion, we
may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which
follows upon any present impression, is deriv'd solely from
that origin. When we are accustom'd to see two impressions
conjoin'd together, the appearance or idea of the one im-
mediately carries us to the idea of the other (T, pp. 102-103)
Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that
principle alone which renders our experience useful to us and
makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events
with those which have appeared in the past. Without the in-
fluence of custom we should be entirely ignorant of every
matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the
memory and senses (IU, pp. 58-59).
Even so, Hume does consider cause and effect reasoning to be
a legitimate form of reasoning; though, as we have seen, the process
involved in such reasoning is far different from that in demonstrative
reasoning, Hume maintains that both are functions of our intellectual
faculty, the understanding;
The understanding exerts itself after two different ways, as
it judges from demonstration or probability; as it regards the
abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects,
of which experience only gives us information (T, p. 413).
Hume maintains that when we reason we ''discover" or "per-
ceive" something. When we reason from demonstration, we perceive
a relation between ideas. What do we perceive when we reason from
cause and effect? We do not perceive any relation between cause and
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effect because, according to IIum.e, there is none present to either
our senses or our intellect. Nor do we perceive the effect which
we are expecting, for we have no impression of the effect at the
time that we are reasoning. What we end up with in such reasoning
is a belief in the existence of an unperceived effect, which is nothing-
more than a lively idea of that effect. Hume equates this with the
discovery or perception of the proposition that a certain effect has
(or will have) existence (T, pp. 96-97 n.
, pp. 97-98). Perception
of objects is accomplished through the impressions of sensation;
perception of propositions is accomplished by the understanding,
via its processes of demonstrative and probable reasoning. It
seems clear that in the following, "objects of reason" refers to
propositions:
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or
falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to
the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter
of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this
agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or
false, and can never be an object of our reason (T, p. 458).
All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally
be divided into two kinds, to with "Relations of Ideas, "
and "Matters of Fact. " Of the first kind are the sciences
of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, and, in short,
every affirmation which is either intuitively or demon-
stratively certain
. . .
Matters of fact, which are the
second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the
same manner, nor is our evidence of their truth, however
great, of a like nature with the foregoing (IU, p. 40).
138
Both kinds of reasoning, then, demonstrative and probable, lead to
the formation of a belief in a proposition.
Now the Reflectivist interpretation of Hume maintains that to
morally evaluate x is to come to believe or assent to a proposition
which asserts that contemplation of x from the moral point of view
causes the experience of a certain moral sentiment; thus, to find x
virtuous (or vicious) is to assent to a certain matter of fact proposi-
tion about x. Yet we come to believe such matter of fact propositions
only as a result of matter of fact reasoning; and Hume explicitly denies
that a moral evaluation is an instance of matter of fact reasoning.
This denial comes in the first section of Book III, "Moral
Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason. " One must be careful here,
for Hume often is careless in making clear to which kind of reason he
is referring. Sometimes by "reason" Hume means to refer to de-
monstrative reason only, as when he says "Reason or science is
nothing but the comparing of ideas, and the discovery of their re-
lations" (T, p. 466); at other times it is clear that by "reason"
Hume means to refer to both demonstrative and probable reason, as
when he says "we infer a cause immediately from its effect; and this
inference is not only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest
of all others" (T, p. 97 n. ). However, Hume leaves no question
that in the section of the Treatise we are now considering, "reason"
refers to both demonstrative and probable reasoning;
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If the thought and understanding were alone capable of fixing
the boundaries of right and wrong, the character of virtuous
and vicious must lie in some relations of objects, or must be
a matter of face, which is discovered by our reasoning.
This consequence is evident. As the operations of human
understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the com-
paring of ideas, and the inferring of matter of fact; were
virtue discover'd by the understanding; it must be an object
of one of these operations (T, p. 463).
Hume then goes on to argue in the remainder of the section that to
morally evaluate is not to engage in a process of reasoning.
The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of
our reason (T, p. 457).
Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason
(T, p. 458).
1 tis impossible, that the distinction betwixt moral good and
evil, can be made by reason (T, p. 462).
the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the
relation of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason (T, p. 470).
The actual examination of Hume's arguments for the conclusion
that moral evaluations are not instances of either demonstrative or
probable reasoning would lead me too far afield of my present pur-
pose. What is important here is that Hume concludes that to morally
evaluate is not to assent to or ''discover" a proposition;
Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists
not in any relations i. e.
,
relations of ideas]]
,
that are the
objects of science [i. e.
,
demonstrative reason]
;
but if
examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not
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in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the
understanding (T, p. 468).
We must, then, reject the Reflectivist interpretation of Hume on
moi al evaluation. Though it may be shown that Hume is not success-
ful in proving that a Reflectivist account of moral evaluation cannot
be correct, we can know that Hume's own account is not Reflec-
tivist.
6
It appears that we have reached an impasse in the attempt
to find a coherent interpretation of Hume on moral evaluation. If
we take Hume's pronouncements at face value, we initially are led
to adopt an Emotionist account, to the effect that an act of moral
evaluation consists in the experiencing of a moral sentiment. But
this interpretation cannot account for certain evaluations that Hume
says we do make, in particular in those cases where the character
or action to be evaluated is distant in time or place, or where we
are unable to adopt the moral point of view. We than consider a
Reflectivist interpretation, to the effect that an act of moral evalua-
tion consists in the assent to a certain type of matter of fact proposi-
tion. This interpretation is able to explain how we can morally
evaluate independently of the actual experience of a moral sentiment;
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but we then find that it is in direct conflict with Hume's insistence
that moral evaluations are not determinations of reason.
There are two conclusions which can be drawn. It may be
that Hume does not give us a coherent theory of moral evaluation
at all. Perhaps he really is maintaining either an Emotionist or a
Reflectivist position, without realizing the inconsistencies thereby
generated. If this is indeed the case, I think the weight of the evidence
is on the side of holding that Hume is an Emotionist with respect to
moral evaluations.
There is yet the second possibility: that Hume is describing
a theory of moral evaluation, neither Emotionist nor Reflectivist,
which explains those features of moral evaluation that the latter
interpretations, taken singly, cannot. In what follows, I will
attempt to work out such an interpretation. Its motivation stems
primarily from a rather strong conviction that to adopt the first
possibility without a struggle is to give up on Hume too quickly. My
interpretation will rely on my account of Hume's moral sentiment,
but it can be adapted to other accounts of the moral sentiment,
including moral sense theories.
For Hume, the contents of moral evaluations are not true or
false, for they are not objects of reason, or propositions. Never-
theless, he implies that some moral evaluations are better than
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others, in that the former, when communicated, are more in-
formative than the latter. For example, expressions of personal
preference are of limited value to society at large. If I publicly
announce that I like what Mr. A did, those who know me well might
be able to glean from this some information about the general
character of Mr. A's action - for instance, that it was helpful to me
in my quest for power. However, those who are strangers to me
Co.n tell nothing about the general nature of Mr. A's action from my
declaration of personal preference, for they know nothing about my
personal tastes and interests.
Moral evaluations are more socially useful than evaluations
based on personal factors because these very factors, which tend to
vary from one individual to the next and which thereby tend to make
our personal preferences differ, are screened out by adopting the
moral point of view. Because, according to Hume, almost all men
are similar in their capacity to sympathize with others and in their
natural emotional reaction to personal pleasure or pain, and because
moral evaluations are rooted in nothing more than these common
qualities of man, when I communicate a moral evaluation of Mr. A's
action it is as informative to a stranger as it is to a friend.
As we have seen, however, even if we adopt the moral point
of view, our moral sentiments can be affected by distances in time
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or place from that which is being evaluated. This introduces an
element ot variability into moral evaluations, one which is based on
a purely personal and unique relation to that which is evaluated,
much as personal tastes and interests introduce that large measure
of variability so characteristic of non-moral evaluations. This
element detracts from the social usefulness of moral evaluation -
every individual occupies a unique spatio-temporal position, and
unless we know this position of one who communicates a moral
evaluation, the information we obtain about what kind of thing it is
that is being evaluated will be limited.
Therefore, Hume implies, a moral evaluation which takes
into account and corrects for this element of variability will be better
than one which does not. Experience alone teaches us how to do this:
In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable,
according to our situation of nearness or remoteness, with
regard to the person blam'd or prais'd, and according to the
present disposition of our mind. But these variations we
regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms
expressive of our liking and dislike, in the same manner, as
if we remain'd in one point of view. Experience soon teaches
us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least,
of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more
stubborn and inalterable (T, p. 582).
Once again, however, we are faced with the task of giving an inter-
pretation of Hume's view of the nature of moral evaluation, one that
explains what it is to correct a moral evaluation. To do this, I be -
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lieve, requires that we take very seriously Hume's contention that
the correction of a moral evaluation is similar to the correction of
a perceptual judgment:
The case is here Qn moral evaluations] the same as in our
judgments concerning external bodies. All objects seem to
diminish by their distance; But tho' the appearance of objects
to our senses be the original standard, by which we judge
of them, yet we do not say, that they actually diminish by
the distance; but correcting the appearance by reflexion,
arrive at a more constant and establish'd judgment con-
cerning them. In like manner, tho' sympathy be much fainter
than our concern for ourselves, and a sympathy with persons
remote from us much fainter than that with persons near and
contiguous; yet we neglect all these differences in our calm
judgments concerning the characters of men
. . .
And tho'
the heart does not always take part with those general notions,
or regulate its love or hatred by them, yet are they sufficient
for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the
pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools (T, p. 603).
Hume's point about perceptual judgments seems to be the
following. In attempting to judge of an external object, all anyone
has to go on is his own impressions, or how the object appears to
him. We soon learn by experience that our impressions of an
object tend to undergo variations. Some of these variations we at-
tribute to changes in the object itself, while others we attribute to
changes in our perceptual relation to the object. We are able to draw
such distinctions by comparing our impressions of the object to
the impressions reported by observers whose perceptual relation to
the object is constant.
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Thus, as I get farther from an object, the object appears to me to
get smaller. Yet, I do not take this as an indication that the object
itself is getting smaller, because I've learned from experience that
in similar circumstances, observers whose distance from the object
remains constant experience no change in their percC; 3 0 f the
object. Since the same object cannot both be getting smaller and not
getting smaller, and since we assume that our impressions are of
the same object, I attribute the change in my perceptions to the
change in my relation to the object, rather than to a change in the
object itself.
In judging of objects, according to Hume, we cannot hope to
judge independently of our perceptions of the object. There is no
reason for thinking that the appearance of largeness of a nearby
object more closely resembles the actual object than does the ap-
pearance of smallness of the same object at a distance (though we
can be sure that the change in the appearance of the object from
large to small as we move farther away from it is not caused by any
change in the object itself): it is just that we must adopt certain con-
ventions in order to communicate effectively with others:
In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions,
and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some
steady and ^general points of view; and always, in our thoughts,
place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation
(T, pp. 581-582).
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Thus, in describing the size of an object, we base our description
on our perceptions when near to the object; in describing the color
of an object, we base our description on our perceptions of the object
when it is illuminated by white light. If we did not adopt such con-
ventions, Hume argues, every man' s description of the world would
be purely subjective; your description of an object wo: i.ve me no
information on what to expect should I observe the same object from
my own unique perceptual point of view. However, if you describe
the object relative to a "conventional" point of view, I then get an
idea of what I will perceive should I observe the object; this remains
the case even if I do not observe the object from the conventional
point of view, because experience teaches me how changes in per-
ceptual relations to an object alter the impressions of the object.
Let us consider a specific example. Suppose I am several
yards away from a fire, so that I feel only a slight warmth from it.
This sensation of slight warmth that I experience is an impression;
as such, Hume tells us, its strength and vivacity is automatically
1 3
of such a degree as to constitute belief. Moreover, Hume con-
siders the reaching of any belief, propositional or not, an act of
judgment; thus, all sensations are, for Hume, perceptual judg-
ments^:
Thus it appears, that the belief or assent, which always
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attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity
of those perceptions they present
... To believe is in this
case to feel an immediate impression of the senses
Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, which
constitutes the first act of judgment
.
.
.
(T, p. 86)
The only existences of which we are certain, are perceptions,
which being immediately present to us by consciousness,
command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation
of all our conclusions (T, p. 212).
But experience teaches me how to "correct" this initial perceptual
judgment by appealing to the impressions which would be experienced
from the conventional point of view - and in the case of sensible
objects the conventional point of view is one of proximity, under
"standard" conditions. I know from experience the kind of sensation
I have when I am very close to a fire; that is, in Hume's terminology,
when I imagine myself close to a fire, I am immediately presented
with an idea of a certain kind of painful sensation.
All objects seem to diminish by their distance; But tho'
the appearance of objects to our senses be the original stan-
dard, by which we judge of them, yet we do not say, that they
actually diminish by the distance; but correcting the appear-
ance by reflexion, arrive at a more constant and establish'd
judgment concerning them (T, p. 603).
By "correcting the appearance by reflexion" Hume means arriving
at the idea of certain impressions (namely, those which would be
experienced by the perceiver while maintaining a certain conventional
point of view) via a process of probable reasoning.
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Hume maintains that we correct our aesthetic judgments in
the same manner as we do our perceptual judgments:
. . . external beauty is determin'd merely by pleasure; and
'tis evident, a beautiful countenance cannot give so much
pleasure, when seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when
it is brought nearer us. We say not, however, that it appears
to us less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will have
in such a position, and by that reflection we correct its
momentary appearance (T, p. 582).
Our initial impression of pleasure must count as an aesthetic judg-
ment. However, experience has taught us what to expect in the way
of pleasui able sentiments should we perceive such a countenance in
close proximity - that is, when we imagine ourselves to perceive the
countenance from a closer point of view, we are immediately pre-
sented with the idea of a greater pleasure. This idea serves as a
corrected aesthetic judgment, and if we have need to communicate
our judgment to another, it is this idea that we refer to rather than
to the initial impression of pleasure.
What, then, is Hume's theory of moral evaluation? I believe
it is as follows. When I contemplate a certain character or action,
and I experience a moral sentiment (or lack of a moral sentiment), I
have thereby morally evaluated or judged the character or action.
Thus, the Emotionist interpretation is so far correct. Where the
Emotionist account goes wrong is in assuming that all moral evalua-
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lions for Hume are of this type. This is similar to the error of
assuming that all perceptual judgments for Hume consist in the
experiencing of sensations. However, as I have tried to show,
corrected perceptual judgments consist in an idea rather than an
impression. Similarly, Hume argues that there are corrected
moral evaluations. I correct my initial moral sentiment by imagin-
ing how the character or action would affect me emotionally should
I be directly acquainted with it and should I adopt the moral point
of view; the corrected moral evaluation consists in the resulting
idea of a moral sentiment.
Let us consider a specific example. Imagine that I read a
newspaper account ot a thief in Australia who steals only from the
rich. My initial reaction is one of approval, for I take pleasure in
seeing the rich suffer a bit. But I then adopt the moral point of
view, and screen out my jealousy of the rich; in sympathizing with
the unpleasantness experienced by the victims, I too experience un-
pleasantness, and this becomes the object of an aversion, which is a
moral sentiment. I now have made a moral evaluation. However,
Australia is far away and I feel very little association with it or its
inhabitants; moreover, the brief newspaper account gives no details
about the victims, and I can only imagine what these faceless people
are going through. These things together lessen my ability to
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sympathize with the victims, and as a result, my sympathetic pain
and consequent aversion, or moral sentiment, are quite weak.
However, I am aware that my moral sentiments can be af-
fected this way, and so I endeavor to correct my initial evaluation.
There have been numerous times in my life when I have been in close
proximity to acts of theft; I have witnessed them, or have had close
friends who have been robbed, or perhaps have committed such acts
myself. In each of these cases, when I have contemplated the act
from the moral point of view, I have experienced a very strong
moral sentiment. When I correct my initial judgment of the man in
Australia, I imagine that I am close to his deeds and I imagine also
that, while in that position, I contemplate his deeds from the moral
point of view. Because experience has taught me how I am affected
under such circumstances, I am led to the idea of a strong aver-
sion. This then is an idea of a moral sentiment because the idea
is of an aversion which follows adoption of the moral point of view.
This very idea of an intense moral sentiment now serves as
my corrected moral evaluation of the man in Australia. If I wish to
describe the degree of viciousness of the man and his deeds, it is
this idea of a strong moral sentiment which serves as the basis for
my description, rather than the rather weak moral sentiment which
constitutes my initial moral evaluation. It might now appear as
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though the Reflectivist interpretation is accurate so far as corrected
moral evaluations go, but this is not the case. According to the
Reflectivist, a moral evaluation for Ilume consists in a proposition
which connects the idea of a certain contemplation to the idea of a
certain sentiment. However, I am arguing that a corrected moral
evaluation consists in an idea of a certain sentiment alone. The
content of a moral evaluation for Hume, then, can consist in an im-
pression or it can consist in an idea of that impression. The former
I shall call an "original" evaluation, while the latter I will refer to
as a "corrected" evaluation.
So far, I have given the following picture of what occurs when
we correct a moral evaluation. Initially, we adopt the moral point
of view, and contemplate a certain character or action. We then
experience a certain degree of moral sentiment. However, we
realize that this initial, or "original, " evaluation might be affected
by our distance in space or time from that which is evaluated; we
then set out to correct the initial evaluation. We imagine that we
are contemplating the same character or action from the moral
point of view, and also that we are directly acquainted with the
character or action. Our imagination, by a customary transition,
then produces an idea of a certain degree of propensity or aversion,
and this idea now constitutes the corrected moral evaluation.
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Yet, it is clear that this same process may be undergone
without the initial or original moral evaluation. For instance, it is
quite common to find ourselves unable to adopt the moral point of
view in certain circumstances. Suppose my brother commits a
crime, in evaluating this action I would be a rare person indeed if
I could separate myself from the intense personal influences in-
volved. Since I cannot adopt the moral point of view, I cannot ex-
perience a moral sentiment; that is, I cannot make what I have been
calling an "original" evaluation.
However, as I interpret Hume, it is still possible in such a
case to make what I have been calling a "corrected" moral evalua-
tion. I can imagine myself contemplating this act from the moral
point of view. Experience has taught me what to expect as a result
of such a contemplation; I am presented, via the mental habit, with
the idea of a strong sentiment of aversion. This idea, then, con-
stitutes a negative moral evaluation of my brother and his action,
even though all my actual sentiments toward my brother may be
positive. It is this idea to which I refer should I express a moral
evaluation of my brother's action;
The passions do not always follow our corrections; but these
corrections serve sufficiently to regulate our abstract
notions, and are alone regarded, when we pronounce in
general concerning the degrees of vice and virtue (T, p. 585).
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There is also another sense of correcting a moral evalua-
tion, one which Hume says very little about. Such a correction can
come about when, after morally evaluating a certain character or
action (either in an original or a corrected evaluation), we get new
information about the kind of character or action it is. For instance,
my friend's ethnic jokes might amuse me, and I might mistakenly
believe that they amuse others as well. I can adopt the moral point
of view, and sympathize with the pleasures that I imagine my friend's
joke telling brings to otners. d he subsequent pleasurable propensity
that I experience is a moral sentiment, and constitutes an original
moral evaluation. However, I may find out that, in fact, my friend's
jokes are disagreeable to others. If I now adopt the moral point
of view, my sympathy with these others will cause me to share in
their displeasure, and my moral sentiment will be one of aversion.
Although this evaluation too would be original in that it is the ex-
perience of an actual sentiment, it can be considered to be an im-
proved evaluation in that it stems from a better understanding of the
effects of that which is being evaluated. Still, it cannot be said that
the first evaluation is false, and the second true, because the content
of neither is a propositional belief.
Hume gives a similar example of such a correction in An
Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals:
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In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of
public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever dis-
putes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning
the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be
decided with greater certainty than by ascertaining, on any
side, the ti ue interests of mankind. If any false opinion
embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail, as
soon as fur tner experience and sounder reasoning have given
us juster notions of human affairs, we retract our first
sentiment and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and
evil.
Giving alms to common beggars is naturally praised, because
it seems to carry relief to the distressed and indigent. But
when we observe the encouragement thence arising to idleness
and debauchery, we regard that species of charity rather as
a weakness than a virtue (I, pp. 12-13).
There is one important difference between corrected per-
ceptual judgments and corrected moral evaluations (that is, those
that consist in an idea rather than a sentiment): the former are
comprised of beliefs whereas the latter are not. An impression of
an object constitutes a perceptual judgment, as, for example, the
sensation of slight warmth from a distant fire. By a habit of imagina-
tion we are soon drawn to a lively idea of intense heat, and this
lively idea constitutes a belief;
All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived
merely from some object present to the memory or senses
and a customary conjunction between that and some other
object; or, in other words, having found, in many instances,
that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold,
have always been conjoined together: if flame or snow be
presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom
to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does
exist and will discover itself upon a nearer approach (IU, p. 60).
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This lively idea or belief is the corrected perceptual judgment;
but Hume insists that an impression of the object is necessary to
give the consequent idea intensity enough to be belief;
• • • I make a third set of experiments, in order to know,
whether anything be requisite, beside the customary transi-
tion, towards the production of this phaenomenon of belief.
I therefore change the first impression into an idea; and
observe, that tho 1 the customary transition to the correla-
tive idea still remains, yet there is in reality no belief nor
persuasion. A present impression, then, is absolutely
requisite to this whole operation (T, p. 103).
If I merely imagine a fire, that is, if I have an idea of a fire which
is not a belief, the "customary transition" in my imagination will
still take place, and I will receive the idea of intense heat; but
since the initial perception was an idea rather than an impression,
the consequent idea will not be a belief.
When I correct a moral evaluation, I do not start with an
impression. Rather, I begin with an idea (one which is not a be-
lief) of a certain contemplation of an action or character from a
certain spatio-temporal position. Experience has taught me that
when I do actually so contemplate similar actions or characters from
that position, a certain sentiment follows; that is, I have a mental
habit of expectation borne from custom. Thus, when I begin with the
idea of that contemplation, I am led to the idea of that certain senti-
ment; but since this transition is from idea to idea rather than from
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impression to idea, the consequent idea of the sentiment is not a
belief.
So far as corrected moral evaluations are concerned, then,
the Reflectivist interpretation is wrong on two counts. In the first
place, I have tried to show that a corrected moral evaluation is not
a belief in or assent to a cause and effect proposition. But not only
is the Reflectivist wrong about what is believed in a corrected
moral evaluation - he is wrong in maintaining that there is belief
involved at all. ^
7
Both the Emotionist and the Reflectivist interpretations have
strong points in their favor; but they each have weaknesses which,
I believe, are sufficient for rejecting them as accurate accounts of
Hume's theory of moral evaluation. In the last section I have given
a new interpretation, and in the present section I wish to examine
whether or not this interpretation shares the strengths while avoid-
ing the weaknesses of the two common interpretations.
The Emotionist account was attractive in that it provided for
the intimate connection that Hume believes to hold between moral
evaluation and action. On my interpretation this connection still
holds for "original" moral evaluations, for here my account is the
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same as the Emotionist: such evaluations consist in the experience
of the moral sentiment.
However, on my interpretation a corrected moral evaluation
consists in the having of an idea of a certain sentiment, rather than
in the experiencing of the sentiment itself. But an idea which is not
a belief is motivationally neutral, and cannot affect our passions
or actions (T, pp. 118 ff. ); thus, it seems, a corrected moral
evaluation does not display that connection between evaluation and
action which,we have up to now assumed, Hume demands of all
moral evaluations. Yet, if we read Hume carefully, it becomes
apparent that he does not demand this connection in corrected moral
evaluations:
But however the general principle of our blame or praise
may be corrected by these other principles, ' tis certain,
they are not altogether efficacious, nor do our passions
often correspond entirely to the present tneory (T, p. 583).
The passions do not always follow our corrections (T, p. 585).
Sentiments must touch the heart £i. e.
,
be experienced as
impressions']
,
to make them controul our passions; But
they need not extend beyond the imagination [i. e. , be ex-
perienced as ideas]
,
to make them influence our taste
(T, p. 586).
We found the Emotionist interpretation to be inadequate
because it could not explain what Hume means by the correction
of moral evaluations, nor could it explain how it is that we can make
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a moral evaluation without feeling a moral sentiment. This dif-
ficulty is overcome by the new interpretation, according to which
a corrected moral evaluation is an idea of a sentiment rather than
a sentiment itself.
The Reflectivist interpretation had the advantage of being-
able to explain the correction of moral evaluations, and how we
can make a moral evaluation without feeling a moral sentiment.
My interpretation too has this capacity. But the Reflectivist account
had to be rejected because it is clearly inconsistent with Hume's
contentions to the effect that to make a moral evaluation is not to
come to believe, or assent to, a proposition. My interpretation
overcomes this difficulty as well. An original moral evaluation,
on this interpretation, consists in an impression; and though, on
Hume's theory, all impressions are beliefs, they are not what might
be called "propositional beliefs. " A corrected moral evaluation
consists in an idea of a sentiment, an idea which is produced by the
same type of mental habit which underlies probable reasoning; but
unlike probable reasoning, which begins with an impression and
terminates in propositional belief, a corrected moral evaluation
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begins with an idea (of a certain act of contemplation) and terminates
with an idea (of a certain sentiment) which is not belief.
Therefore, my interpretation does seem to combine the
strengths of the Emotionist and the Reflectivist interpretations,
while at the same time avoiding those inadequacies which caused
their ultimate rejections.
8
My primary concern to this point has been with an examina-
tion of what constitutes a moral evaluation for Hume, rather than
with interpreting Hume on moral discourse. There is good reason
for this: I do not find any theory of moral language in Hume. Ardal,
among others, agrees with me here;
In the Treatise, Hume explains the nature and origin of
evaluations; but he is not concerned with evaluative lan-
guage
.. . Hume does not give us, in the Treatise, a theory
of moral language, but an account of the nature and origin
of evaluations. If Ethics is defined as the analysis of
moral discourse, Hume's Treatise does not contain much
in the way of Ethics. What it does contain is an account
of the way the concepts of virtue and vice have their source
in human emotions-*- '
That Hume avoids linguistic analysis should not be surprising if
we remind ourselves of what Hume is attempting to accomplish in
the Treatise and in the Inquiries which followed: the development
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of a "science of human nature. " The full title of the Treatise itself
affirms this. Now the use of language is a characteristic of human
nature; but the use of a particular language, or of particular lin-
guistic expressions (and the concepts they express), is not. Thus,
linguistic analysis, unless it be concerned with discovering struc-
tural similarities in all languages, does not have a place in Hume's
philosophy.
What does occupy such a place, however, is a study "of the
understanding" and "of the passions, " elements which are common
to all humankind; and one of the most important of the passions is
the moral sentiment: "The notion of morals implies some sentiment
common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to
general approbation and makes every man, or most men, agree
in the same opinion or decision concerning it" (I, p. 93). It is the
study of this moral sentiment, and of its role in moral "opinions
or decisions, " that Hume finds to be the proper object of study for
a philosopher of morals. Those philosophers who pay too much
attention to language "encroach upon the province of grammarians
and
. . .
engage in disputes of words, while they imagine that they
are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern"
(I, pp. 127-128).
Of course, it is entirely possible, and perhaps probable.
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that Hume did have a theory about how moral evaluations are com-
municated. Ii there are any signs of such a theory in what Hume
has given us, it seems to me that these signs are most easily
interpreted as pointing to some form of emotive theory of moral
utterances, for Ilume occasionally talks of "expressing" our moral
sentiments or "communicating" them. 18 On my interpretation of
Hume on moral evaluation, this emotivism would have to be of a
strangely modified form; what I've called an original evaluation
would be communicated by expressing a moral sentiment, but a
corrected evaluation would have to be communicated by expressing
an idea (or concept) of a moral sentiment.
It would be natural, then, to ask how we could know whether
another's communicated moral evaluation was an expression of a
sentiment or of an idea of a sentiment. The answer, assuming that
the other's utterance is all we have to go one, seems to be that we
cannot know. But that does not matter for Hume, for in either case
we are gaining the same information about the thing evaluated:
namely, that it is the kind of thing which when contemplated from
the moral point of view, and from a spatio-temporal proximity,
causes in the judger a moral sentiment. That is why Hume can
maintain that corrected moral evaluations are "sufficient for dis-
1
1
course.
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^Frankena, pp. 91-92.
3
Lenz. p. xvi.
3Ardal, pp. 194 ff.
4There are exceptions: "Beside good and evil, or in other
words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from
a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of
this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happi-
ness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites.
These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and
proceed not from them, like the other affections" (T, p. 439).
5A s we have seen, Hume often insists that the moral senti-
ment itself is a pleasure or pain, but I have tried to show the in-
consistency in this.
^Hunter, p. 62.
7Kydd, p. 172.
8 Ibid.
,
p. 172.
^Iiume denies that there is any idea of existence as such. To
believe in the existence of x is, for Hume, to have an intense idea,
or conception, of x, where that intensity approximates that of an
impression (T, pp. 94-95, pp. 96-97 n. ).
1(
^It is odd that Hume here allows that memory can provide us
with a "repetition" of a former impression of sensation, for he
previously leads us to believe that the rr emory generates lively
ideas, or beliefs, rather than actual impressions (T, pp. 8-9).
H Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford:
1972), pp. 60-69).
^ 3The kernel of Hume's argument is contained in the follow-
ing:
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Moials excite passions, and produce or prevent actions
Reason ol itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The
rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our
reason (T, p. 457).
Hume means to include by reason here both demonstrative and
probable reason. But Hume admits that probable reason, unlike
demonstrative, can prompt or excite passions. For instance, I
am walking along a country road when I see a juicy red apple on a
tree. Probable reason informs me that eating this apple would be
a pleasant experience, and I come to experience the direct passion
of desire toward the apple. Certainly this must count as a case of
reason exciting a passion (T, p. 459), and thus one of Hume’s pre-
misses is, by his own account, false.
Hume seems to realize this, for he next argues that, though probable
reason can excite passions in certain cases, nobody has ever con-
sidered such reasonings to be either moral or immoral.
A person may be affected with passion, by supposing a pain
or pleasure to lie in an object, which has no tendency to
produce either of these sensations, or which produces the
contrary to what is imagin'd
. . . But tho' this be acknow-
ledg'd, ' tis easy to observe, that these errors are so far
from being the source of all immorality, that they are
commonly very innocent, and bring no manner of guilt upon
the person who is so unfortunate as to fall into them. They
extend not beyond a mistake of fact, which moralists have
not generally suppos'd criminal (T, p. 459).
Reason and judgment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of
an action, by prompting, or by directing a passion: But it
is not pretended, that a judgment of this kind, either in its
truth or falshood, is attended with virtue or vice (T, p. 462).
But Hume is confused here. When he states that "morals excite
passions, " he is referring to moral evaluations or judgments; for
instance, my judgment that stealing is wrong can excite passions in
me, and prevent me from committing such an act. Hume now wants
to show that such evaluations cannot be matters of probable reason-
ing. He attempts to show this by arguing that judgments of probable
reason are never themselves judged to be virtuous or vicious. How-
ever, this is entirely consistent with moral judgments themselves
being judgments of probable reason. Hume cannot show that moral
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evaluations are not probable reasonings by showing that acts of
probable reasonings are not morally evaluated.
For another and much more detailed examination of Hume's argu-
ment. that the rules of morality
. . .
are not conclusions of our
reason, " see Rachael M. Kydd's Reason and Conduct in Hume's
Treatise.
13 Belief, then, need not necessarily be reached by rea-
soning; all impressions, whether of sensation or reflection, are
beliefs. It is important to notice, however, a crucial difference in
beliefs leached through reason and those which are impressions.
A reasoned belief is a lively idea, and can be expressed pro-
positionally. An impression, however, can not be expressed
propositionally. Still, for Hume there is only one kind of belief,
and this is because belief is defined by him in terms of the vivacity
or intensity of a mental content, a content being either an im-
pression or an idea.
14For Hume, then, to judge is not necessarily an act of the
understanding.
1 sThe following should not be confused. My idea of an im-
pression can be of varying intensity; if it is intense enough, it
constitutes a belief in the existence of the impression. But my
idea is also of a more or less intense impression; that is, my idea
is of an impression that has a certain intensity. I can have an idea
of a slight headache, or I can have an idea of one that is severe.
°This is not to say that we cannot come to believe, after
making a corrected moral evaluation, the proposition that a certain
contemplation would cause a certain sentiment. But the act of
making a corrected moral evaluation is not itself the assent to
such a proposition.
l^Ardal, p. 190 and p. 212.
l^See, for instance, T, p. 582; I, p. 93; I, p. 95.
l^In the case of an original evaluation, contemplation of
the character or action is actually causing a moral sentiment,
whereas in the case of a corrected evaluation, the character or
action is of a kind whose contemplation from the moral point of view
has caused the moral sentiment in the past, and thus formed that
mental habit which is the basis of the corrected evaluation.
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CHAPTER VII
HUME'S ETHICS: AN OVERVIEW
1
No detailed interpretation of Hume's ethical theory can be
considered complete without a discussion of the by now notorious
passage of the Treatise which reads as follows:
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation,
which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every
system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being
of a God, or makes observations concerning human af-
fairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead
of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is_ not, I
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible;
but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or af-
firmation, ' t is necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and ex-
plain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this
new relation can be a deduction from others, which are
entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly
use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to
the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention
wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let
us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not
founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd
by reason (T, pp. 469-470).
This passage is of both historical and contemporary importance.
On the one hand, a proper interpretation of the passage requires
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a proper interpretation of the whole of Hume's ethics. On the
other hand, the question of whether or not, or how, moral judg-
ments are related to factual judgments is still very much a live
issue. A discussion of this passage, then, makes a useful and
fitting final chapter to this thesis, because any proposed inter-
pretation of Hume's ethics should provide a coherent interpreta-
tion of the passage; and once we understand what Hume is saying
here, we have some basis for placing Hume in the ancient, but
still active, controversy of fact versus value.
The mistake I believe Hume is charging to all the other
systems of morality with which he's met is the assumption that the
content of a moral judgment is a proposition. ^ What these other
systems attempt to do is to give arguments or proofs for various
moral judgments. Now, quite justifiably, these other systems also
assume that moral propositions are in some way different from
those that express matters of fact or relations of ideas. For Hume,
however, all propositions express either relations of ideas or
matters of fact. So, Hume is demanding that these other systems
make clear just what this new kind of proposition is, that it be
"observ'd and explain'd. "
But Hume's attack does not stop there. There are two kinds
of proof for Hume. A demonstrative proof employs demonstrative
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reasoning, and involves the comparison of ideas. Such reasoning
will have as premisses propositions which are relations of ideas,
and its conclusion must also be a proposition which is a relation
of ideas. A probable proof employs probable reasoning, and is
based on those mental habits which are generated by experience.
Such reasoning will have as premisses at least one proposition
which is a matter of fact, and its conclusion must also be a matter
of fact. So Hume is issuing this further challenge to the other
systems: "Let me, for the moment, allow you your new kind of
proposition. You seem to maintain that such a proposition can be
proved, employing as premisses propositions which are either
relations of ideas or matters of fact. But so far as I know, there
are only two methods of proof or reasoning; and as long as we have
as premisses propositions which are either relations of ideas or
matters of fact, the conclusions we can reach by proof must be
either relations of ideas or matters of fact. Show me, then, how
your new kind of proposition can be proved, or deduced, from
ordinary propositions as premisses. " Hume concludes that if the
defenders of the other systems would try to meet these challenges,
their ultimate failure would force them to see that moral evaluations
are not "perceiv’d by reason" - that is, they are not propositions
at all.
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To make a moral evaluation for Hume, as I have tried to
show, is not to assent to a proposition; it is to experience a certain
sentiment, 01 to have an idea of that sentiment. A proof, or deduc-
tion, is for Hume a process of reasoning (either demonstrative or
probable) which generates "assurance, M or belief, in a proposition.
Because to morally evaluate is not to assent to or come to believe
a proposition, Hume's theory denies that a moral judgment can be
arrived at by a deduction.
Now the question of the relation between fact and moral value
is often regarded as the question of the autonomy of ethics, and the
nature of this latter question is often obscured by the ambiguity of
the term "autonomy. " It seems to me that those who use this term
usually have in mind one of two different meanings. According to
the first, to say that ethics is autonomous is to say that moral
evaluations cannot be inferred (or, in Hume's terminology, "de-
duced") from non-moral premisses. In this sense of the word,
Hume indeed is maintaining the autonomy of ethics.
But according to the second sense, to say that ethics is
autonomous is to say that the act of making a moral evaluation is
no more than contingently related to the experiencing of certain
sentiments or attitudes. Hume's ethics is not autonomous in this
sense, for Hume maintains that to experience a moral sentiment
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is logically equivalent to making a moral evaluation (at least, an
original moral evaluation).
2
Contemporary philosophers of ethics must find a kindred
spirit in Hume, for his ethical theory is primarily meta-ethical
in nature. What Ilume is attempting to provide is an analysis of
the nature of moral evaluation; when one morally evaluates pre
cisely what is one doing? That is the central question for Hume;
and he believes it is to be answered only by observing actual in-
stances of such evaluation;
We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science
from a cautious observation of human life, and take them
as they appear in the common course of the world, by
men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleas-
ures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously
collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them
a science, which will not be inferior in certainty, and will
be much superior in utility to any other of human compre-
hension (T, p. xix).
What Hume finds is that to make an original moral evaluation
is to experience a certain kind of sentiment. In this he presages
what has come to be called the "noncognitivist" theory of moral
judgment, a theory which denies that moral evaluations are judg-
ments that something is the case. On such a theory, moral
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judgments have no truth value. So it is with Hume, for feelings
are not the sort of things which are true or false:
Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement
either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence
and matter of fact
. . . Now 1 1 i s evident our passions
. . .
are
not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement
'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either
true or false (T, p. 458).
But perhaps no other moral philosopher has examined in such
great detail the nature of this moral sentiment. In the Treatise, we
found the moral sentiment, as I interpret it, to be the instinctive
propensity or aversion toward (sympathetic) pleasures or pains,
consequent to adopting the moral point of view. Now Hume is
sometimes accused of unjustifiably assuming that all (or almost all)
people who are fully informed as to the facts concerning x will make
the same moral judgment about x; and I think that people look for
this assumption in Hume because they think he needs it to make his
theory of moral evaluation coherent. “ Yet Hume needs this assump-
tion only if his theory is that a moral judgment is a factual judgment
about how all, or most people, properly informed and objective,
would feel about the thing evaluated. This, I have tried to show,
is not his theory.
Nevertheless, it is true that if there were not a general
unif ormity in the way people react to similar things, moral
discourse would break down. The utility of moral discourse
171
does depend on a general uniformity in the way people react
emotionally to similar things when regarded from similar points
of view. If there were not this uniformity, the moral judgments
of others, even though made from the moral point of view, would
give me no information whatever about the things evaluated; some
people might experience the moral sentiment of approval upon
contemplating acts of cruelty, while others might experience the
moral sentiment of disapprobation from acts of kindness. Thus,
the expression of the moral sentiment of approval or disap-
probation would become useless as an indicator of the nature of
the thing evaluated; the expressions of moral judgments would
convey no more than autobiographical information. Moral dis-
course would lose that social function which is its real value.
But Hume does not need to assume that most all factually
informed people will make the same moral judgments, for his
theory of the moral sentiment as given in the Treatise provides
for its truth. It is a matter of fact, confirmable by observation,
that almost all men have the capacity to sympathize with others,
though to varying degrees. Hume finds this ability to sympathize
to be a universal element in human nature. Nor can it be disputed
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that most all men have an instinctive propensity for pleasure and
aversion to pain. But these facts, together with Hume's theory of
the moral sentiment ( in the Treatise ) guarantee that most all men,
who are fully informed and who have adopted the moral point of
view, will make similar moral judgments. In this way the social
usefulness of moral discourse is retained within Hume's theory,
without the need of an apparently unwarranted assumption.
3
My main concern in this thesis has been historical, rather
than critical. We must understand what Hume is saying before we
can evaluate what he says. However, I propose, in this last section,
to devote some time to this latter task.
In terms of exposition, I find Hume's work to be highly
erratic. For instance, his work on induction, in both the Treatise
and An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, is a marvelously
clear piece of philosophy. Yet, his ethics suffers by comparison.
The many different interpretations that have been given of his ethical
theory is ample evidence of this. Hume just does not make it clear
what he takes a moral sentiment to be, nor how this sentiment is
related to a moral judgment. My interpretation seems to me to
make the most sense of what Hume says; even so, it raises many
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questions.
For instance, what motivates Hume to adopt a moral sense
theory in An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, after he
has devoted so much of the Treatise to working out an alternate
account of the moral sentiment? Is it merely a retreat from the
"ardor of youth"? Now we know that Hume's lost confidence in
mental associationism primarily is responsible for his abandoning
the attempt to explain the mechanism of sympathy, treating sym-
pathy in the Inquiry as an ultimate principle. This notwithstanding,
he still could have followed the scheme of the Treatise , where the
moral sentiment is treated as the emotional reaction to sympathetic
pleasures and pains. There seems to have been no need for Hume
to adopt a moral sense theory in the Inquiry , as I believe he does.
In light of Hume's antipathy toward the adoption of unnecessary
ultimate principles, this transition from the Treatise to the Inquiry
is all the more puzzling.
Hume seems to hold the same theory of moral evaluation in
both the Treatise and the Inquiry . But the weakest part of this
theory is the account of the correction of moral evaluations. As I
have interpreted this part of Hume's theory, a corrected moral
evaluation consists in the idea of a moral sentiment; and I believe
that this is the only way to interpret what Hume means here, without
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contradicting his denial that a moral evaluation involves pro-
positional belief, and without ignoring his statements to the effect
that we can make a moral evaluation without having the moral
sentiment.
But a theory which holds that a moral evaluation can consist
in an idea of a moral sentiment hardly seems satisfactory. The
moral sentiment itself, whether on the account of the Treatise or
on that of the Inquiry
,
cannot be experienced by an act of the will,
any more than can physical pain on Hume's theory. Thus, when an
act of moral evaluation is taken to consist in the experiencing of a
moral sentiment, as Hume does for original evaluations, we get as
a result that one cannot make whatever kind of moral evaluation one
wishes with respect to a certain character or action; and this is
certainly a desired result, if moral discourse is to have any social
usefulness whatever. But if an act of moral evaluation can consist
in the having of an idea of a moral sentiment, one can, it seems,
make whatever moral judgment one wishes with respect to a certain
character or action, for Hume tells us "The mind has the command
over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as
it pleases" (T, pp. 623-624), and "The imagination has the command
over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the
ways possible" (T, p. 629).
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Let us again consider a specific case. My brother commits
an act of murder; I wish to pass a moral evaluation, but I find myself
unable to take the moral point of view. I cannot then experience a
moral sentiment, and thus cannot make an original moral evaluation.
But, according to Hume, I can make a corrected moral evaluation.
I imagine myself adopting the moral point of view and contemplating
my brother's action. What happens next, as I interpret Hume, is
that I am presented, via a mental habit, with the idea of that feeling
which has in the past followed contemplations of similar actions.
This feeling, presumably, would be an aversion, and my idea of
this aversion now counts as a corrected moral evaluation.
The difficulty with this, however, is that, if I wish, I can
imagine (that is, form the idea of) any feeling to follow the con-
templation of this act from the moral point of view, including a
pleasurable propensity; that is, it seems, I can overcome any mental
habit I might have in this respect by an act of the will. This being
so, it seems that I can make whatever corrected moral evaluation
of my brother's action that I please. It is clear that such a pos-
sibility destroys the very purpose of corrected moral evaluations,
which is to "correct the momentary appearance of things, and over-
look our present situation" (T, p. 582).
Hume's difficulty is the result of two intuitions that he never
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successfully reconciles* that moral ev&luution is ultimately rooted
in human feeling, and that human feeling alone cannot provide a
suitable foundation for the social usefulness, or objectivity, of
moral discourse. Hume's account of the correction of moral evalua-
tions is the focal point of this failure, Yet, we should not allow this
to color our estimate of Hume as a moral philosopher, for if we
consider philosophy to be a certain kind of mental activity, under-
gone with a very special dedication of spirit, Hume is a philosopher
par excellence:
When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost
extent of human reason, we sit down contented
. . .
And
as this impossibility of making any farther progress is
enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a
more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of
his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that
error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their
conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most,
certain principles. When this mutual contentment and
satisfaction can be obtained betwixt master and scholar,
I know not what more we can require of our philosophy
(T, p. xviii).
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